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The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending model has become increasingly popular in China in recent years. 
In 2012, there are only 298 P2P platforms operating in China and loan volume is 22.9 billion RMB 
while in the first half of 2018, there are 1881 P2P platforms and trading volume has reached 7.33 
trillion RMB. Although both number of platforms and transaction volume have increased 
significantly, severe asymmetric information still discourages participants. This doctoral thesis 
uses three empirical chapters to investigate the P2P lending market in China. Drawing on Message 
framing and signaling theory, we first examines the extent to which message framing is associated 
with funding outcomes receive in the context of P2P lending and whether positive message 
framing reinforces the positive impact of credit ratings on funding outcomes. Using a Heckman 
two stage model, we find that the use of positively framed messages is positively associated with 
positive funding outcomes. Besides, positive message framing enhances the positive impact of the 
credit ratings (an example of costly signals) on funding outcomes.  
We then investigate the role of psychological distancing and language intensity in P2P funding 
performance. We bridge the P2P lending literature and psycholinguistics literature and set out to 
explain how psychological distancing manifested by linguistic styles can influence lenders’ 
decision on P2P funding campaign. We find that linguistic styles related to psychological 
distancing are negatively related to P2P funding success. Moreover, the language intensity tends 
to strengthen the negative relationship between psychological distancing and funding success. This 
finding is consistent with psycholinguistics literature which suggests that psychological distancing 
is associated with negative interpersonal outcome (Simmons et al, 2005; Revenstorf et al, 1984). 
Specifically, the number of “you” and the number of negations used in borrowers’ description are 
negatively related to the willingness of the lender to support the funding campaign. The intensive 
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language negatively strengths the relationship between the funding performance and number of 
“you” but does not apply to number of negations.  
Lastly, we investigate the funding performance of the financial excluded borrower in a large P2P 
lending platform. The association of financial technology (fintech) and financial exclusion has 
attracted attention since rapid growth of fintech innovation. Using loan-level data from a lending 
Chinese P2P company, we find there is a negative indirect effect of financial exclusion on funding 
success through credit score. In a moderated mediation analysis, we also find new business model 
such as offline authentication and education qualification positively moderates the linkage between 
the financial excluded and credit score and therefore negative indirect effect of financial exclusion 
on funding success is overturned when the excluded borrower has conducted offline authentication 
and obtained higher education qualification. In the end, we examine the determinants of offline 
authentication decision. We find the borrowers in a city with better financial infrastructure are 
more willing to conduct authentication. However, the financial excluded borrowers are less likely 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background 
Peer-to-peer lending, abbreviated P2P lending, is the transaction of lending money through online 
services to individuals or businesses.  Scholars define P2P lending as unsecured lending 
relationship that cuts off financial intermediary between borrowers and lenders via online platform 
(Lin et al, 2009; Bachmann et al, 2011; Tao et al, 2017).  Since, at beginning, the P2P lending 
platforms offer these services entirely online, they can operate with lower overhead and keep the 
service in a lower price than traditional financial institutions. Therefore, through online transaction, 
P2P lending makes borrowers without going through any traditional financial intermediaries 
(Berger and Gleisner 2009; Wang et al. 2009; Bachmann et al. 2011). 
Since the launch of the first Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending platform, Zopa, in 2005, the P2P lending 
has become increasingly important in credit market for both consumers and entrepreneurs. It is 
part of a larger crowd funding movement which adopts internet to get access to collective funding 
(Burtch et al. 2013). This lending marketplace is created to supplement traditional bank lending to 
meet the needs of individuals and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). For example, P2P 
lending helps the people who find difficult to obtain loans from financial intermediaries such as 
banks get access to the funding they need.  
The Chinese P2P market begins at 2007 since the launch of the first platform, Paipaidai. During 
recent years, the P2P lending market has grown very fast in China because of growing credit 
demand from both entrepreneurs and consumes. According to the data provided by wdzj.com, a 
third party website that provides a comprehensive data for Chinese P2P lending market, there are 
1881 P2P platforms operating up to the first half of 2018. The total accumulative transaction 
volume of P2P lending platforms has reached 7.33 trillion RMB. In the first half of 2018 the 
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number of online borrowers and investors respectively reached 4.35 million and 4.08 million. 
However, in 2012, there are only 298 P2P platforms and loan volume is 22.9 billion RMB. 
The marvelous growth of P2P industry can be attributed to following reasons (Xu, 2017). First, 
the financial services are insufficient from both demand and supply side. On the demand side, 
households who have financial needs and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are underserved 
by existing financial system. The big and connected companies such as State-Owned enterprises 
(SOEs) have access to relatively sufficient funds at reasonable cost. Yet, SMEs do not get funding 
opportunities or pay high price. Chinese financial institutions prefer large firms and the financial 
system is designed for their needs. ). On the contrary, the financial institutions in the US provide 
services to all types of customers including small business and households. There are a large 
number of community and regional banks to serve small firms and households. The Chinese 
government therefore adopts a relatively tolerant attitude toward fintech innovation aiming to 
provide financial services to a large group of people (Wang et al., 2016). Taking P2P lending for 
example, it was not clear which regulatory authority should oversee P2P platforms for many years 
and no special license is required to run the P2P platform (Wang et al., 2016). Firms from other 
industries can also easily expand their business into fintech industry. For example, the Chinese 
government issued financial licenses to many technology companies such as Alibaba, Jingdong 
and Tecent enabling them become fintech firms. Even in the developed countries, it is impossible 
to see a highly regulated industry to accept such firms. On the supply side, wealth and middle class 
households find difficult to make good investment. Over the past decades, the income growth and 
saving rate have increased significantly, which creates tremendous demand for wealth 
management. They may eventually become active investment opportunity hunters in the P2P 
market.  
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Second, the advances in information technology lift the barriers of financial services, expand the 
customer base and create the new business model. For example, the big data collection and analysis 
enable financial institutions to deliver their services to larger group of people. The technology can 
be more accurate in determining creditworthiness of borrowers who do not have credit history and 
extend credit to them. Third, the loose regulation in the industry leads to abnormal business 
adventure and risk-taking including Ponzi schemes. There are no proper regulations for the 
industry before 2015. Only after excessive frauds were unveiled, the initial regulations were 
proposed in 2015 and came effective in 1st July 2016. The tolerant attitude to P2P lending can be 
attributed to the desire of developing better financial system. The notion that China’s financial 
system is underdeveloped is well-accepted. Therefore, anything that can contribute to the 
development of the system is encouraged but sometimes without prudent supervision. Many 
platforms take risks and conduct Ponzi-like operation. They collect funds from new customers and 
pay interest to the old ones. They use rest of the money to invest in highly risky projects and hope 
to make swift gain. If they made wrong investment decision, they just lose other people’s money. 
This is an asymmetric information that probably persists in all financial institutions. Due to the 
tolerant attitude of the authority, it is not uncommon that Ponzi-like platform flourished, which 
results in small-scale crisis.  
Although P2P lending platform is an information media between borrowers and lenders, the 
internet-mediated environment not only produces useful information but noise and spurious 
information as well. To get the project funded, borrowers will always pretend to have good credit 
history and projects. Without investment experiences and deep investigation, it is difficult to 
identify good borrowers from bad borrowers. Moreover, it is not cost efficient for individual 
investors to carry out information analysis. Traditionally, specialized financial institutions are 
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responsible for solving the information asymmetry. Yet, asymmetric information online contains 
much more noise and it is difficult for participant to differentiate.  
The difficulties that P2P industry is experiencing are largely due to information asymmetry among 
lenders, borrowers and the platform. Traditional financial institutions reduce asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers in two ways, relationship approach (by building long 
term relationships with customers and collecting soft information) and the transaction approach 
(which relies on the collection of hard information through financial statement and historical credit 
data) (Berger and Udell, 2002). Yet, in P2P industry the relationship approach cannot be used as 
the platform is structured in such a way that long-terms relationships cannot be built. As for the 
second approach, platforms may not have operational for a period of time long enough to be able 
to collect sufficient hard information on the borrowers.  
Asymmetric information has been noticed in P2P lending literature. Researchers have suggested 
that asymmetric information problem can be alleviated if borrowers can send costly signals to 
lenders (Caldieraro et al., 2018). Lin et al (2013) finds that social capital increases P2P funding 
success, lowers interest rate on funded loans and decrease the default rate. Liu et al (2015) find 
when offline friends place bid in P2P lending campaign, potential investors are willing to follow 
with a bid. However, if lenders lack of investment knowledge and experiences, which is common 
in the P2P lending market, checking costly signals is challenging (Anglin et al, 2008). Moreover, 
costly signals are not easy to obtain in the P2P market (Loewenstein et al., 2014). Therefore, the 
first study (chapter 2) suggests borrowers’ message framing that communicates their 
trustworthiness to potential lenders is a solution of asymmetric information. Drawing upon 
message framing theory and costless signaling theory, the paper arguestrust-related message 
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written in borrowers’ loan application positively predicts the probability of funding success and 
the message framing can also reinforce the effect of credit rating on funding success. 
The results from first study are consist with existing literature which shows  language plays an 
important role in crowdfunding (Herzenstein et al, 2011; Dorfleitner et al, 2016; Defazio et al., 
2020; Huang et al., 2020; Parhankangas and Renko, 2017; Larrimore et al., 2011). However, not 
only what they said matters but how they conveyed message influences likelihood of funding 
success as well. The questions of “how” is related to linguistic styles. Unlike content words such 
as adjectives, verbs and nouns, style words do not carry much meanings. Yet, psycholinguistics 
literature suggest style words are associated with individuals’ social and psychological worlds and 
contribute to appeal to audiences for communicators (Pennebaker and Chung, 2013; Tausczik and 
Pennebaker, 2010; Parhankangas and Renko, 2017). Extant research shows that the frequency of 
certain style words we use is associated with how we are perceived by others and has an impact 
on outcomes such as academic performance and funding campaign of social entrepreneurs 
(Robinson et al.,2013; Parhankangas and Renko, 2017; Fausey and Boroditsky, 2010). 
Furthermore, Larrimore et al (2011) find stylistic features of messages can be effective in 
assessment of source trustworthiness especially in an online environment where social cues such 
nod and smile about the information source are less reachable. Therefore, it is expected that P2P 
lenders are also sensitive to the use of linguistic styles of borrowers.  
Certain style words are closely related to psychological distancing. Parhankangas and Renko (2017) 
define Psychological distancing is to the extent to which people distance or remove themselves 
away from the topic being discussed. The borrowers may unconsciously use of certain style words 
that are associated with psychological distancing and disconnect to the lenders on an emotional 
level because certain language use can distance away relationships (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 
 6 
2010). Similarly, Nook et al (2017) suggests that psychological distance is embedded in language 
use. For example, use of present-tense verbs and first person pronouns which are commonly used 
style words imply temporal and social closeness rather than distancing (Mehl et al., 2013; 
Pennebaker and King, 1999). Hence, the second study (chapter 3) argues that psychological 
distancing measured by style words alienates the P2P borrowers from their crowds. Given the tone 
is an important determinants of communication quality, it also suggests that intensive tone 
negatively moderates psychological distancing and funding performance.  
The purpose of establishment of P2P platform is to meet the financial needs of the borrowers. P2P 
platforms therefore are similar to microfinance institutions in many ways although P2P platforms 
mainly operate online. One of the main objectives of them are allaying financial exclusion. 
Kempson and Whyley (1999a,b) have identified five dimensions of financial exclusion including 
access exclusion, condition exclusion, price exclusion, marketing exclusion and self-exclusion. 
The third study (chapter 4) focuses on difficulty of accessing financial resources and it is a supply-
side issue of financial exclusion. To alleviate financial exclusion is a critical element for poverty 
reduction and economic growth. For example, using a natural experiment in Mexico, Bruhn and 
Love (2014) find more access to financial services results in an increase in income for low-income 
people and a decrease in unemployment. Due to only a few people who are able to access to basic 
financial services nowadays, alleviating financial exclusion is yet an unfinished task.  
P2P lending offers a potential avenue for addressing the financial exclusion. Komarova Loureiro 
and Gonzalez (2015) suggest due to substantial bureaucracy and paperwork in traditional financial 
institutions, it is costly to get access to funding while the recent technology has overcome this 
difficulty and can complete the deal within few days by P2P platforms. However, the empirical 
evidence regarding P2P lending and financial exclusion is in general mixed (Komarova Loureiro 
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and Gonzalez., 2015; Lin and Viswanathan, 2015). The results from third study (chapter 4) shows 
that P2P lending doesn’t necessarily alleviate financial exclusion. Due adverse credit score, the 
financial excluded are less likely to be funded. In addition, it finds through platform offline 
authentication, the financial excluded can increase their chance of getting funds. It also shows that 
the excluded borrowers will have a better chance if they obtained a higher education qualification.  
Asymmetric information and P2P lending in China 
 
The asymmetric information means one party has better information than the other party in the 
transaction. This asymmetry among the parties may result in a failure in the functioning of the 
market (See Akerlof, 1970). For example, in the P2P lending market, all the entrepreneurs claim 
that they have promising projects and are worth for the fund. Yet, it is probably that only half are 
“good”. How to identify the “good” has attracted attentions by the related parties.  Spence (1973) 
posits that the asymmetric information can be alleviated when the high-quality entrepreneurs 
send “signals” to communicate their quality. Sending signals is costly so low quality 
entrepreneurs are unable to send these “signals”. In the traditional credit market, the lenders or 
investors can require collaterals provided by the borrowers to signal their creditworthiness. 
However, in P2P market, collaterals are normally not required and therefore it is more difficult to 
signal creditworthiness. Actually, P2P lending is mainly unsecured loans. These loans are 
provided to those who have difficulties to acquire loans from traditional financial institutions 
such as banks (Milne and Parboteeah, 2016). P2P platforms are proud of that they can serve a 
larger group of costumer at a relatively low cost. Yet, Freedman and Jin (2011) argue compared 
to offline credit markets, P2P lenders encounter severer asymmetric information because people 
cannot authenticate the online information.  
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Signaling theory has been therefore widely applied to crowdfunding literature (Anglin et al, 
2018; Steigenberger and Wilhelm, 2018; Kromidha and Robson, 2016; Ahlers et 
al.,2015).Traditional signaling theory pays closer attention to costly signals. For instance, good 
education background of job candidates can serve as a meaningful signal that they are skilled 
workers to employers (Spences, 1973). Since obtaining a degree from good university is costly, 
candidates with this degree are highly likely to be good quality. In the context of crowdfunding, 
costly signals such as use of media, human capital, social capital and intellectual capital have an 
influence on crowding performance (e.g., Anglin et al, 2018; Ahlers et al.,2015; Courtney et al, 
2017). In addition, the theory concludes that language-based signals are in general inefficient 
because they are costless for both high and low-quality senders (Steigenberger and Wilhelm, 
2018; Farrell and Rabin, 1996). Receivers are also more likely to rely on costly signals that are 
able to separate high and low quality to make decisions. Moreover, Farrell and Rabin (1996) 
refer to language-based signals as cheap talk.  
Yet, management studies and practices emphasize the importance of costless signals. 
Researchers find that language that consists of charisma, confidence, optimism, resolve, 
narcissism and entrepreneurial passion has a great impact on resource acquisitions (Martens et al, 
2007; Aktas et al, 2016; Davis et al, 2017; Avey et al., 2011). For example, Martens et al (2007) 
identify several identities such as aspiration and ambition within IPO prospectuses significantly 
influence IPO process. Scholars investigate in the role of language in P2P market as well (e.g., 
Herzenstein et al, 2011; Michels, 2012; Dorfleitner et al, 2016). Herzenstein et al (2011) examine 
whether identity claims invoked in borrowers’ language influence lender decision using Prosper 
dataset and they find larger number of identity claims in borrower description will increase 
funding success rate and lower the interest rate changed but a negative association between the 
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number of identities and loan performance. Dorfleitner et al (2016) studying two German 
platforms find spelling errors, text length and positive emotion evoking keywords have an impact 
on funding success but little influence on delinquency. Consistent with Dorfleitner et al (2016), 
using a Chinese P2P dataset, Han et al (2018) find completeness of description and positive 
sentiment language are more likely to get funded. In addition, the communication between lender 
and borrower is able to result in funding success. The number of borrowers’ responses positively 
affect funding success but lenders’ comments influence funding success negatively (Xu and 
Chau, 2018).   
Asymmetric information is more severe in Chinese P2P market because Chinese P2P lending 
platform uses their own credit rating system to evaluate the trustworthiness of borrowers, unlike 
UK or US where the credit score is assigned by specialized and independent rating agency (Tao 
et al, 2017). There is lack of reliable personal credit rating agencies in China, although Ant 
financial (a financial subsidiary of Alibaba group) provides credit scores to individuals. The 
scores assessed by Ant financial are biased because they are likely to give good rating to the 
people who use the services provided by Alibaba. So, Chinese platforms nowadays are not 
willing to adopt Ant financial’s credit rating and assess the credit history of the borrowers by 
themselves. Moreover, the majority of Chinese P2P platforms don’t apply Web 2.0 functionality 
which enables communication between lenders and borrowers. This means that most of Chinese 
P2P investors can only see static listing information and are not able to directly exchange 
information with the borrowers while investors in Prosper (a US based P2P platform) can 
communicate with the people who would like to support. The only exception is that Xu and Chau 
(2018) find a unique dataset from a Chinese P2P platform and examine the impact of lender-
borrower communication on funding success but they use a fictitious company name for 
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confidentiality. In addition to this, another key difference is that unlike developed economies that 
use a pure online lending process, Chinese P2P platform provides offline authentication service 
to further mitigate asymmetric information that is originated by pure online authentication. 
Despite the important role of offline authentication, the study on offline authentication is scarce. 
This thesis tries to fill this gap by investigating the role of offline authentication in different 
context.   
1.2 Research motivations and research questions 
 
The credit risk management in the traditional credit market is mature. The borrowers’ collateral 
and credit score will determine the loan terms such as the loan amount and interest rate. The 
financial institutions will conduct periodic review to ensure the borrower will pay back the loan. 
However, the P2P industry is lacking such process and the credit risk therefore cannot be well 
controlled. Due to the imperfection of the online lending process, borrowers strategically hide 
their credit information to obtain funds from the market. Funds are limited resources. When the 
borrowers cannot pay back the loan, the total amount of money will be less and new investors are 
hesitant to enter the market. If so, financial inclusion which is one of the main objectives of 
financial technology cannot be achieved. Hence, an important question in P2P market is how 
participants mitigate risks associated with information asymmetry. To better understand this 
question will also be beneficial to participation in the market and financial inclusion. 
Studies have suggested that language and associated message framing (two cheap signals) are 
able to address the risks generated by information asymmetry as they would help lenders to 
differentiate between high and low-quality borrowers (Anglin et al., 2018; Loewenstein et al., 
2014). Cheap signals are useful especially when costly signals are difficult to obtain and people 
are lack of experience to judge costly signal (Loewenstein et al., 2014; Anglin et al, 2008). Yet, 
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extant research finds mixed evidences regarding cheap signals in online environment. For 
example, Ludwig et at (2013) suggest message framing does not perform well in online review 
evaluation while Anglin et al (2018) shows cheap signals that indicate a successful borrower 
have a positive effect on crowdfunding performance. Existing studies examining the role of 
cheap signals in the P2P lending have focused on a small set of signals such as photographs, 
message length, text descriptions and spelling mistakes (Dorfleitner et al., 2016; Duarte et al., 
2012). These papers provide limited insights into the impact of message framing on a lender’s 
decision in the context of P2P lending. Therefore, the study 1 asks: Does cheap signals 
associated with language have an impact on funding performance? Does cheap signals 
complement traditional costly signals in the evaluation of the trustworthiness?  
Moreover,  studies suggest borrowers’ language normally focus on different aspects in different 
types of funding campaigns (Parhankangas and Renko, 2017; Anglin et al., 2018; Block et al., 
2018; Herzenstein et al., 2011; Allison et al., 2013; Majumdar and Bose, 2018) . In reward-based 
crowdfunding, the language often centers on new product development plan, while in P2P lending, 
borrowers tend to stress on evidence-based elements because personal details and loan 
characteristics can appeal more lenders (Lee et al., 2019; Allison et al., 2013). Extant studies have 
tested linguistic styles, measured by use of some style words and found lenders form perceptions 
about prospective borrowers based on the style words and therefore style words influence lenders’ 
decision (Parhankangas and Renko, 2017). Due to different focus of entrepreneurial narratives in 
P2P lending, it is important to investigate how P2P lenders form the perception of linguistic styles. 
Moreover, the language intensity can also affect the funding outcome (Han et al., 2018). To date, 
researchers have studied these two factors in isolation. Yet, linguistic styles and language intensity 
are actually inseparable. Lenders receive both together to form opinions about the borrower. In 
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addition, scholars tend to pay attention to how positive linguistic styles improve likelihood of 
funding success. Extant literature largely ignores the negative effect of some linguistic styles such 
as psychological distancing on funding outcomes (Huang et al., 2020). Given the fact that the 
important role of psychological linguistic styles on online context (Ludwig et al., 2013; Peng et 
al., 2004), the study 2 asks: Does psychological distancing affects P2P funding outcomes and Does 
language intensity strengthen this relationship? 
P2P lending enables borrowers to get unsecured loans (e.g., loans without collateral) from 
individual lenders in a P2P platform (Lin et al., 2013). The unsecured loans lift the barriers of 
people getting the loan to some extent so researchers consider P2P lending may allay financial 
exclusion (Sparreboom and Duflos, 2012). The study to examine the interplay between financial 
exclusion and P2P lending success is scarce and contradictory (Komarova Loureiro and Gonzalez., 
2015; Lin and Viswanathan, 2015). More importantly, little is known about the role of credit score, 
offline authentication and educational attainment in the linkage between the financial exclusion 
and P2P funding success. The research gap is problematic given the asymmetric information of 
financial excluded borrowers can be reduced by these factors, thereby promoting participation 
from the lenders and contributing to financial exclusion. Related parties such as P2P platforms and 
the government can act accordingly based on these information. We first begin to fill the gap by 
examining the mediating role of credit score. Does the credit score play a mediating role in the 
association between the financial excluded and funding success? Second, we test moderated 
mediating of role of offline authentication and human capital. Does offline authentication and 





1.3 Data and Methodology 
 
1.3.1 Data 
The P2P platform in China offers us a laboratory to study the questions mentioned above. First, 
the number of P2P lending participants in China has increased significantly in recent years. Second, 
there are many P2P platforms in China providing offline authentication to mitigate asymmetric 
information given the asymmetric information is particularly severe in the market. The following 
three empirical studies will therefore mainly use the data from Renrendai. Renrendai is one of the 
largest P2P platforms operating in Mainland China and many papers use Renrendai’s data due to 
representativeness. (Mi and Zhu, 2017; Tao et al, 2017 and Yao et al., 2018). Renrendai was 
established in 2010 and registered capital is 100 million RMB. In January 2014, Renrendai 
acquired venture capital (130 million dollar) from TrustBridge Partners. Until Oct 2018, the 
accumulative transaction reaches 71.4 Billion RMB (Renrendai.com). Now it has been ranked 2nd 
by wdzj.com among all 1881 P2P platforms in China and has more than 1 million members located 
in over 200 cities (Chen et al., 2019). The loan application process is very similar among Chinese 
P2P platforms although each platform has their own in-house credit rating system. 
The loan application process is as following. Frist, borrowers submit their application form with 
their national ID number and other personal information. They would need to specify the requested 
loan amount, the interest rate they would like to pay, the duration they will pay back the loan, the 
purpose of borrowing and any other information they find helpful to their application. The platform 
will then access their ID, mobile number, address, employment, income and etc. it is suggested by 
the platform to disclose additional information such as education qualification, car and house 
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ownership, marital status and other professional certification to promote their credit rating. At the 
end, the platform will verify the information submitted by applicants and assign a credit grade to 
the applicant. Each credit grade corresponds different credit rating from HR (high risk) to AA 
(very safe). Given the similar operation models of the P2P platforms in China, the Renrendai we 
select is not an outlier. We crawled the data between 1 Jan 2015 and 31 Dec 2015 from the 
Renrendai official website. The information includes loan information (e.g., interest rate, loan 
amount and etc), demographic information (e.g., borrowers’ age, education attainment, gender and 
etc) and borrowers’ narratives. The total number of listing is more than 400,000, which is 





Heckman two stage model are applied in the study 1 and study 2. The adoption of Heckman two 
stage model is to address sample selection issue that widely exists in the literature. The scholars 
usually delete P2P loans with offline authentication when they study loan description (e.g., Chen 
et al., 2018). However, we argue that simply removing these listings will result in sample selection 
bias. We therefore apply Heckman model to solve the issue. The Heckman model has two step: 
the first step is to estimate the likelihood of borrowers choosing offline authentication by applying 
a probit model to whole sample including all listings with and without offline authentication. In 
the second step, the sample is restricted to the listings without offline authentication. Then, we 
estimate the effect of words written in borrowers’ description on funding performance. As both 
offline authentication and funding success are dummy variables, we apply a probit with sample 
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selection model, so called heckprobit. Although we call it two step, the software estimates first 
and second-step simultaneously by using a maximum likelihood estimation approach (Andres, 
2014). Identification of selection equation requires at least one variable that influences the choice 
of offline authentication but not affect investors’ decision (Pham and Talavera, 2018). Branch will 
be used to meet this exclusion restriction. Branch is dummy variable, taking value of one if there 
is an offline branch in borrower’s city or zero otherwise. This variable is valid because lenders’ 
decision is unlikely to be affected by a city’s offline branch and the establishment of offline branch 
affects borrowers’ offline authentication decision. In the second step, only the sample without 
offline authentication is selected. Control variables include some demographic and listings factors 
such as age, degree, income, interest rate, log loan amount, duration and credit rating.  
The study 3 adopts structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the mediation /moderated mediation 
effect of credit score, offline authentication and human capital in the relationship between the 
financial excluded and funding success. There are many studies that recommend SEM approach 
to test mediation effect (Iacobucci et al., 2007; Zhao et al., 2010; Cho and Pucik., 2005). Using 
SEM instead of three separate regressions proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) can better control 
for measurement errors which might result in under- or over-estimation of mediation effects 
(Shaver, 2005). In addition, it can also estimate everything simultaneously rather than assume the 
equations are independent. However, the nature of our dependent variable (funded is a dummy 
variable) makes a linear SEM ill-suited. Applying a linear model with dummy dependent variable 
will lead to biased results. Hence, we use Generalized SEM (GSEM) model that allows binary 
outcome to fit our proposed regressions (Kaplan and Vakili., 2014). We apply linear regression to 
first part of analysis (determinants of credit score) and logit regression with a dummy dependent 
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variable to second part (determinants of funding success). Bootstrapping is used to estimate 
standard error and confidence intervals for the indirect effects.  
 
1.4 Chapter conclusion 
 
The introductory chapter shows an overview of following three empirical studies. It provides 
background information of P2P market, motivations and key research questions of the empirical 























The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, it examines the extent to which message framing is 
associated to funding success and to the number of bids projects receive in the context of P2P 
lending; second, it investigates whether positive message framing reinforces the effect of credit 
rating on funding success. Our analysis is conducted on a dataset of 33028 listings of potential 
borrowers from a Chinese P2P lending platform using a Heckman selection model. We find that 
the use of positively framed messages through written language positively predicts the likelihood 
of funding success although it is not correlated to the number of bids the project receives. In 
addition, the use of positive language enhances the effect of borrowers' credit rating on funding 
success. Our results contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of cheap signals in the context 
of Internet-based interactions while highlighting complementarities between different types of 




Financial technologies (‘FinTechs’) are changing the face of global finance by integrating finance 
and technology in ways that disrupt traditional financial models while providing an array of new 
services to businesses and consumers. The hybridization of technology with the traditional 
processes of finance has replaced traditional structures as well as leveraging alternative business 
models that take advantage of the new technologies and market conditions. Importantly, Peer to 
Peer (P2P) lending (thereafter, P2P lending) has given rise to a new means of finance, where 
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individual lenders make unsecured loans to other borrowers seeking funds for individual and/or 
business purposes (Lin et al., 2013).  
Traditionally, financial institutions deal with asymmetric information on the quality of the 
borrowers either by building long-term relationships with customers so that “soft” information on 
loan applicants can be collected or by developing credit score systems that rely on the collection 
of “hard” information from loan applicants through transactional data (Landström, 2017). 
However, these two strategies to mitigate the risk posed by asymmetric information on the quality 
of the borrowers are not entirely viable in the context of the P2P platforms. Indeed, P2P platforms 
are structured in such a way that long-terms relationships with customers cannot be easily built 
while at the same time, platforms may not be in a position to easily collect “hard” information on 
their clients given the fact that they have not been operating for a long time. In other words, 
“centralized” solutions led by the platforms themselves are not viable.  
In the case of P2P platforms, it has been argued that lenders’ message framing aiming at 
communicating their trustworthiness to potential borrowers can be a solution to the risks generated 
by asymmetric information. Message framing through language is usually considered to be a low-
cost (Anglin et al., 2018) and therefore different from costly signals which are less imitable and 
more valuable and can facilitate the sorting between high quality signalers from low quality 
signalers (Anglin et al. 2018). For example, when lenders lack sufficient experience and 
knowledge about an investment, which can often be observed in P2P lending context, assessing 
costly signals such as credit rating of a borrower becomes challenging (Anglin et al, 2018).  
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Cheap signals1 are particularly useful when costly signals are difficult to collect (Loewenstein et 
al., 2014). However, previous studies have found mixed results about the effectiveness of message 
framing, usually considered a cheap signal, in the context of Internet-based interactions. In 
particular, while Ludwig et al.’s (2013) study have shown that message framing may not always 
be important in the evaluation of online reviews, Anglin et al. (2018) observe the effectiveness of 
projecting the attributes indicative of successful lenders through language, as a cheap signal, on 
crowdfunding success.  Studies examining the role of cheap signals in the context of P2P funding 
have focused on a small set of signals such as photographs, message length, text descriptions and 
spelling mistakes (Dorfleitner et al., 2016; Duarte et al., 2012). However, these papers provide 
limited insights into the impact of message framing on a lender’s decision in the context of P2P 
lending. Still, this issue is important to investigate since the uncertainties of P2P lending decisions 
ex-ante and the associated costs of these decisions ex-post (Dorfleitner et al., 2016; Duarte et al., 
2012; Guo et al, 2016) are higher than those involving other forms of internet-based interactions 
such as online reviews.  
While positive framing of a message through written language can overcome the challenges of 
assessing the soft qualities of borrowers due to the limitations of forming long-term relationships 
in the context of P2P lending, it may also provide complementary knowledge in the evaluation of 
costly signals about borrowers such as their credit ratings. The study also suggests that message 
framing including cognitive and affective attributes such as trustworthiness can play a significant 
role in complementing costly signals such as credit ratings. The study contributes to previous 
research on P2P lending by investigating not only the influence of message framing through 
                                                          
1 The concept is rooted in the signalling theory and refers to the fact that some signals individuals transmit can be either costly (i.e. 
a certain amount of time and effort is required to be able to send the signal) or cheap (i.e. very little effort is required to be able to 
send the signal). 
 20 
language but also the complementary role of different signals in affecting funding decisions within 
P2P lending settings (Dorfleitner et al., 2016; Duarte et al., 2012; Guo et al, 2016; Davis and 
Allison, 2013).  
Against this background, the purpose of the paper is two-fold. First, it examines to what extent 
message framing is correlated to funding success in the context of P2P lending using insights from 
the signaling and message-framing theories. Second, it assesses how it complements credit rating 
in conveying potential lenders soft information on the characteristics of the lenders so that the 
project may be funded. Our empirical analysis is conducted on a data-set of 33028 listings drawn 
from the leading Chinese P2P platform, Renrendai. The results suggest that the use of positive 
message framing in the description of the project positively predicts the likelihood of funding 
success but not the number of bids. In addition, message framing enhances the effect of borrowers' 
credit rating on funding success. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 develops our set of hypotheses on message 
framing and funding success. The empirical methodology and the data are presented in Section 3. 
The empirical results are discussed in Section 4 while the robustness tests are presented in Section 
5. Finally, a discussion on the implications of the results is presented in Section 6 while some 
concluding remarks are offered in Section 7. 
 
2.2 Theoretical background 
 
Signaling theory focuses on the mechanisms that may reduce asymmetric information between 
two parties. More specifically, it focuses on whether and how a more informed sender (e.g. the 
borrower) communicates information (i.e. a signal), and how a less informed receiver (e.g. 
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potential investor) interprets the signal (Lee et al., 2016). Communication between parties can be 
realized by sending costly signals which are based on observable actions or qualities and/or cheap 
signals which are less observable and rely mainly on words or cheap talk (Cheung et al., 2014). 
Traditionally, signaling theory argues that costly signals are more effective in solving the 
asymmetric information problem than cheap signals. For example, while the costs of obtaining 
IS09000 certification are high due to its labour-intensive and time-consuming nature, such costs 
improve communication of quality signals and make false signaling more difficult (Connelly et al., 
2011). In this context, the traditional argument of the signaling theory suggests that evaluating 
quality from a cheap signal is challenging (Anglin et al, 2018; Farrell and Rabin, 1996; 
Steigenberger and Wilhelm, 2018) as there is little or no explicit cost to acquire and send, and 
therefore it is effective when objective information about the sender is unavailable. There are many 
examples this is the case. For instance, Chen et al. (2009) find that entrepreneurial passion (a cheap 
signal) is an intangible and hard-to-measure quality of potential entrepreneurs which however does 
not help them in acquiring resources through venture capital. Thus, venture capitalists tend to rely 
on costly signals about the quality of the entrepreneurial venture. Yet, these studies focus on very 
specific circumstances when cheap gnals can deliver valuable information to receivers (e.g. 
investors) in an effective way (Danilov and Sliwka, 2016; Marti and Balboa, 2007).  
Cheap signals such as message framing are particularly useful when the audience lacks 
sophistication and the costly signals received are difficult to assess (Loewenstein et al., 2014). This 
can be relevant to the case of P2P platforms. Indeed, investors of P2P lending platforms are often 
challenged when assessing the costly signals associated with it (Anglin et al, 2018). In these cases, 
message framing may be one of the most important cheap signals that potential borrowers may 
have to convince lenders to support the project (Anglin et al, 2018; Steigenberger and Wilhelm, 
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2018). As such, signaling theory can be complemented by message-framing theory: it suggests 
that whether the way the message is framed through language will act as a signal which can affect 
a receiver’s (i.e. investor’s) actions or decision-making (Lee and van Dolen, 2015). The literature 
on message-framing mostly agrees that consumers with low level of involvement in a decision are 
strongly influenced by positively framed messages (Bester and Jere, 2012; Maheswaran and 
Meyers-Levy, 1990). In online environments, the use of language through textual messages and 
interactions for sharing sentimental or affective expressions, and cognitive messages is the main 
means of communication (Lee and van Dolen, 2015). As opposed to offline contexts in which 
verbal and facial communication is used, in online environments, users affectively and cognitively 
frame messages by using language through textual interactions (Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy, 
1990). Particularly, to produce favorable responses, users need to use positive language exuding 
confidence, credibility, trustworthiness and optimism (Aktas et al, 2016; Avey et al., 2011; Davis 
et al, 2017; Martens et al, 2007). In line with this view, the previous research in branding area 
shows that when brands fail to communicate positive signals about their characteristics and quality, 
customers are likely to exhibit lower attitudes, quality perceptions and purchase intentions towards 
their products (Besharat, 2010). When applied in a P2P lending context, positive message framing 
to communicate information about the attributes of borrowers may be correlated to funding success 
by facilitating the evaluation of costly signals (like credit ratings) reflecting the qualities of 
borrowers (e.g., Anglin et al, 2018; Ahlers et al., 2015; Courtney et al, 2017). 
 
2.2.1 Hypothesis Development  
Trustworthiness is an individual attribute which reduces transaction costs and provide relational 
advantages in exchange relationships (Dyer and Chu, 2003). Trust can be either cognitive or 
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affective. Cognitive trust emerges from the perceived ability and competence of the other party. 
Affective trust derives from positive feelings and caring motivations of the other party (Dowell et 
al., 2015). In this sense, positively framed message signaling trustworthiness can stimulate both 
cognitions and emotions in the trusting party (or trustor).  
  
Öhman el at (2001) demonstrate that emotions communicated through language can drive attention 
by generating a number of positive sentiments towards an individual or a situation. Sentiment is a 
person’s positive and/or negative emotional disposition towards another person or object. For 
example, sentiments of trustworthiness enable the trustor to establish emotional bonds with the 
trustee (Dowell et al., 2015). Thus, in general, positive sentiment may result in positive responses, 
whereas negative sentiment elicits negative reactions (Hsu et al., 2019). In the context of P2P 
lending, if the sentiment expressed in the description of the potential borrower and of the project 
conveys the notion that the borrower is trustworthy, then the project will receive attention from 
potential lenders which will translate into a higher number of received bids and possibly being 
funded. In particular, borrowers can enhance their trustworthiness by demonstrating positive and 
affective sentiments of concern and care in making timely repayments of loans to the lenders. 
Dorfleitner et al.’s (2016) study supports this view by observing that specific keywords (attached 
to certain sentiments) may have a positive influence on funding success of P2P loans. As a result, 
possible lenders will pay attention to those who use positively framed messages that emphasizes 
borrowers’ trustworthiness in terms of their caring and concerning attitude for the investors.  
 
Studies on message persuasion suggest that affective and cognitive states of persuasion are 
intertwined rather than separate (Homer and Yoon, 1992). On the one hand, affective framing of 
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messages through positive language is observed to prompt the cognitive involvement of the 
receivers (Lee and van Dolen, 2015). On the other hand, messages triggering cognitive beliefs 
regarding trustworthiness can develop affective state of trust (Johnson and Grayson, 2005). In 
terms of cognitive effects, positively framed messages have a direct effect on cognitive beliefs 
regarding the trustworthiness of a party (Claeys and Cauberghe, 2014). Indeed, positive language 
has the potential to convince receivers about a sender’s trustworthiness in terms of its ability and 
competence to achieve a particular goal (Newman et al, 2014), and control over outcome (Luthans 
et al, 2004). In line with this view, previous studies report that an individual’s need for cognition 
or cognitive effort devotes more attention to rationally framed messages (Zhang and Buda, 1999). 
An emphasis on the ability and competence of a trustee would be interpreted as signals affecting 
cognitive beliefs and can therefore strongly impact the probability of funding success (Ahlers et 
al., 2015).   
 
Framing language to communicate the message of trustworthiness is even more important in low-
trust cultures such as China. At the personal level, “low trust” in the Chinese communities 
manifests itself in the lack of personal trust. Fukuyama (1995) attributes culture to the origin of 
“low trust” in the Chinese communities in which people can trust people they have a connection 
with. At the societal level, “low trust” also manifests itself in the lack of trust towards institutions 
and governing bodies. Ke and Zhang (2003) argue that underdeveloped institutions such as defense 
of private property rights and lack of market mechanisms underlie the prevailing low institutional 
trust in the Chinese communities. In such institutional environments, it is hard to trust people that 
are not known personally (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000). In low-trust cultures such as China, 
investors need to be reassured about the trustworthiness of the borrowers, particularly in online 
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P2P settings, even more than in Western countries characterized by a high trust culture (Welter & 
Smallbone, 2006). Thus, positive message framing can play a greater role in triggering cognitive 
beliefs regarding trustworthiness and developing affective state of trust. Against this background, 
we posit that:  
 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a). Framing the message so that it suggests the borrower is trustworthy is 
positively related to the likelihood of a project being funded.  
Hypothesis 1b (H1b). Framing the message so that it suggests the borrower is trustworthy is 
positively related to the number of bids a project receives.  
 
In an environment with pervasive asymmetric information, making decisions based on one set of 
signals – either costly or not - can be difficult. However, the presence of different types of signals 
may not solve the problem (Plummer et al., 2016) since taken together the two sets of signals may 
provide contradictory messages to receivers of the signals (Anglin et al, 2018). In such situation, 
receivers implicitly rank the quality and clarity of the signals they receive and decide which signal 
they decide to rely on. In general, receivers would tend to rely on costly signals more than on cheap 
signals due to their more reliable nature (Connelly et al., 2011). However, in the context of P2P 
lending, costly signals including individual credit scores (or ratings) can be complemented with 
the information on the quality of the potential borrower that cheap signals can provide. For 
example, Davis and Allison (2013) show that while costly signals are beneficial on funding success, 
cheap signals enhance these benefits by providing an effective form of communication between 
entrepreneurs and funders. Indeed, in noisy environments like P2P lending platforms, more 
information is required to make decisions, in which the complementary role of positive message 
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framing emphasizing the trustworthiness of a borrower may enhance the effectiveness of costly 
signals such as credit rating in funding success (Anglin et al., 2018). In other words, positive 
message framing may strengthen the impact that other signals have on the likelihood of receiving 
funding (Anglin et al, 2018).  We therefore suggest that: 
 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a). Framing the message so that it suggests the borrower is trustworthy 
positively moderates the association between credit rating of the borrower as a costly signal and 
the likelihood of a project being funded. 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b). Framing the message so that it the borrower is trustworthy positively 
moderates the association between credit rating of the borrower as a costly signal and the number 
of bids a project receives. 
 
2.3 Empirical analysis 
 
2.3.1 P2P lending in China 
Scholars define P2P lending as unsecured lending relationship that cuts off financial intermediary 
between investors and lenders by using online platform (Lin et al, 2013; Bachmann et al, 2011; 
Tao et al, 2017). In this industry, China is the world leader by any indicator. The first P2P platform, 
PPdai, was established in 2007 and the market began to explode in 2013. According to data 
collected by P2P consultant WDZJ.com, the trading volume of the Chinese P2P lending market 
expanded to 127 times its original size, from $3 billion in 2012 to $381 billion in November 2017. 
Meanwhile, total outstanding loans grew 221 times, from $0.8 billion in 2012 to $177 billion in 
November 2017 (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 P2P Trading Volume and Loan Balance in China: 2012-2017 
 
Three main factors explain the popularity of P2P lenders platforms in China (Huang, 2018; Mittal 
and Lloyd, 2016). The first one is the supply shortage in the formal financial markets, especially 
for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and poor households. In China, banks overlook 
small borrowers (Fungacova and Weill, 2014).   State-owned banks dominate the financial system, 
with a preference for lending to state-owned companies and the absence of a mature system for 
assessing consumer credit-risk adds to banks’ reluctance to lend to individuals (Boyreau-Debray 
and Wei, 2005).  Second, the regulatory environment has been very tolerant to alternative finance 
providers. Lack of regulation in the industry is explained by the belief that alternative providers 
could produce useful innovations while giving raise to limited risks due to their size (Wang et al., 
2016). The third factor is the rapid development of internet-based startups, which are challenged 
to borrow from traditional sources of finance due to their limited resources and instable revenue 






2.3.2 The Renrendai platform 
 
For our empirical analysis we will use data extracted from an online P2P platform called Renrendai. 
This is one of the largest P2P platforms operating in China and several studies have already used 
their data (Mi and Zhu, 2017; Tao et al, 2017 and Yao et al, 2018). Renrendai was established in 
2010 by three graduate entrepreneurs (Zhang, Li, and Yang) and it is the third largest P2P platform 
in China as of October 2018 according wzdj.com). 
The loan application process set up by Renrendai is as follows. First, borrowers submit their 
application form with their national ID number and other personal information. They would need 
to specify the requested amount, the interest rate they would like to pay, the expected duration and 
purpose of the loan and any other information they find helpful to their application. The platform 
will verify the information submitted by applicants and assign a credit rating to the applicant 
varying between HR (high risk) and AA (very safe). The loan application process adopted by 
Renrendai is very similar among Chinese P2P platforms. First, like the majority of Chinese P2P 
platforms, Renrendai does not offer Web 2.0 functionality (Liu et al, 2018) implying that investors 
can only see static listing information and are not able to directly exchange information with the 
borrowers2. In addition to this, another key difference is that unlike developed economies that use 
a pure online lending process, Renrendai (and other Chinese P2P platforms) provide an offline 
authentication service to further mitigate asymmetric information that is originated by pure online 
authentication.  In particular, they all use in-house credit ratings (generated using data submitted 
by the loan applicant at the moment of the application) to segment borrowers according to risk. At 
beginning of the operations, Renrendai adopted a pure online model similar to US platforms; 
                                                          
2 This is different from what happens in other countries. For instance, investors in Prosper (a US based P2P platform) can 
communicate with the potential borrowers and potentially can elicit more information about their trustworthiness.  
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however, they changed their model after they merged with Ucredit3 and started to trade as Youxin 
Financial. Renrendai explains their process of pre-loan risk control on their website as follows: 
·        Use of self-developed credit and risk analysis system; 
·        Verification manually conducted by themselves or their partner (Ucredit) of every loan 
application to ensure the authenticity of all information. In their website, they explain that they use 
the internet, telephone and other means they deem efficient to conduct what they claim “thorough 
and careful verification”. 
Credit rating is assigned by Renrendai. But they use two approaches to do it and bill the resulting 
applications as two different investment products. They offer borrowers the choice of whether to 
use their offline verification services or not. If the services are used, the application is billed as an 
offline verified investment product. Otherwise, it is billed as authenticity checked product. The 
respective processes are as follows: 
·       Option one: the application submitted online → documents desk checked → A credit rating 
assigned → the application up online for bidding 
·       Option two: the application submitted to a Ucredit’s branch with a request for use of offline 
verification services → documents checked and verified offline → the verified application 
transferred to Renrendai → a credit rating assigned → the application up online for bidding.  
All borrowers recommended by Ucredit will be assigned A class credit rating when their 
applications are listed online. Credit ratings of non-offline verified applications range more widely.  
                                                          
3 Ucredit was founded in May 2011 in Shanghai by a team of entrepreneurs. Ucredit focuses on micro financing to individuals, and 
has a network of 300 branches in near 100 cities nationwide. Individuals can apply for micro loans to Ucredit in four ways: a) 
Online application through Ucredit website; b) Online application using WeChat APP; c) Application in branches and 
d) Application through Ucredit customer services hotline. Ucredit does not list any loan applications on their website for investors 
to bid, although they accept online applications. Ucredit currently focuses on two products: Instant micro loans that targets 
individuals who have a credit line of up to RMB 300,000 for the purpose of personal consumption, Elite micro loans that target 
civil servants, policemen, doctors, lawyers, and employees in large state-owned enterprises and banks. Micro loans to micro and 
small businesses do not appear to be their main focus anymore. 
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Renrendai charges borrowers initial service fees (one-off) 0%, 1%, 2%, 2.5%, 3%, 4% and 5% for 
AA, A, B, C, D, E, HR loans respectively. After that, they charge monthly management fees 0.55%, 
0.60%, 0.65%, 0.70%, 0.75%, 0.80%, and 0.88% for AA, A, B, C, D, E, HR loans respectively. 
Interest rates vary in accordance with a borrower’s credit rating, ranging from 6% to 24%. If the 
listing is unsuccessful, there is no fee for the applicants. Loans accessed through the Renrendai 
platform are all uncollateralized. The maximum duration of the loan is up to 3 years and the size 
of the loan ranges between 3000RMB and 500,000RMB. Renrendai guarantees the loan will be 
paid back to lenders by the end of the loan. To do so, it has a reserve fund to cover possible defaults 
and late payment. The fund is topped up constantly by the service fees charged. If the platform 
fails to collect back the loan, a collection agency will step in and the money eventually collected 
will be put it into the reserve fund. 
The data for our empirical analysis is retrieved from the Renrendai platform and refer to all the 
listings between 1 Jan 2015 and 31 Dec 2015. We only focus on the loans that will be used to fund 
a start-up-related activity (based on the listing title)4. There are 43824 listings in our dataset. After 
deleting missing values, our dataset of made of 33028 listings. Among them, 9020 listings are fully 
funded. Each listing has the full set of information available to potential lenders. These include: 
(a) the loan terms such as interest rate, loan amount, loan duration, (b) credit rating assigned by 
the platform and (c) demographic information of the applicant such as gender, age, educational 
attainment, marital status, employment status and personal income range. 
Why should some applicants prefer online applications only if they are more likely to be 
downgraded and less attractive to investors? Since Ucredit does not charge loan applicants for the 
use of their offline verification services, affordability of offline services is clearly not a factor. 
                                                          
4 Listing titles vary substantially and include (among the others) medical expense, house purchasing, wedding ceremony preparation 
etc.  
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Three potential explanations can be accessibility, risk-taking, and self-confidence. First, Ucredit 
establishes their branches primarily in the first-tier cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen) and in some second-tier cities (Chongqing, Dalian, Chengdu, Ningbo). This means that 
they are less likely to conduct verification on applicants in cities they do not have branches. So, 
branch accessibility can be reasonably considered a factor that influences the take-up of offline 
services. Second, non-users of offline services are generally young (on average they are 30 years 
old) and may be more willing to take a chance with online services. Mature users may be more 
conservative than younger ones and thus are more likely to take up the offline services. So, risk-
taking may be a factor. Third, as opposed to users of offline services, non-users are less likely to 
own a home property and a car and thus are less likely to have a mortgage and a car loan. As a 
result, the average loan they asked in the P2P platform is ten time smaller (RMB 5,279 against 
RMB 69,171). Indeed, their borrowing records suggests that non-users have very low success rate 
in loan applications anyway. For every ten applications they made, they succeeded at the rate of 
0.17. In contrast, for users, for every 1.2 applications, the success rate was 1.007. Taken together, 
it is suggested that individuals who do not use offline services have no collateral and no credit 
history, implying that they cannot have access to loans. Hence, the offline services work like banks: 
individuals tend to avoid them if they know they have no chance of getting funds.  
 
2.3.3 Empirical model and variables 
 
In our model the propensity of a project to get funds (and the number of bids it attracts) is a function 
of a number of projects’ characteristics (interest rate, amount requested and maturity) as well as 
the characteristics of the potential borrower namely its income, education and age. We add the 
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indicator of trust and the number of words as our key regressors that allow us to test for the 
relevance of H1. The difference between the two models is in the dependent variable. Whether a 
loan is funded is dependent variable for Model 2 while the number of bids a listing obtains is the 
dependent variable for Model 3. Whether a loan is funded is a dummy variable, which takes one 
if the loan application is successful and zero otherwise. The second dependent variable is the 
number of bids which is proxied by the number of lenders who bid in this campaign.  If H1 holds 
true, then the coefficients associated to the variable trustworthiness will be positive and significant. 
To test H2 we use similar specifications as above but we interact the indicator of trust with the 
applicant’s credit rating (as assigned by the platform); if H2 holds true, the coefficient β3 and 
γ3 will be positive and significant. 
Importantly, borrowers who would not choose offline authentication have different characteristics 
from those who would. Hence, it is highly likely that factors that influence whether borrowers use 
offline services could be correlated with the dependent variables of each equation creating a sample 
selection bias. To correct for such a bias, we use the Heckman selection model to estimate our 
model (Heckman, 1979). The Heckman model has two steps: the first step is to estimate the 
likelihood of borrowers choosing offline authentication by applying a probit model to whole 
sample including all listings with and without offline authentication. In the second step, the sample 
is restricted to the listings without offline authentication. Both dependent variables, offline 
authentication and funding success, are dummy variables and therefore we estimate a probit model 
with sample selection. STATA estimates the two equations simultaneously by using a maximum 
likelihood estimation approach (Andres, 2014). 
The identification of the selection equation requires at least one variable that influences the choice 
of offline authentication but not affect investors’ decision (Pham and Talavera, 2018). So, we 
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create Branch which is equal to one if borrowers’ location has an offline branch to do physical 
check and zero, otherwise. This is also a proxy for financial accessibility. People who live in some 
Chinese major cities are better off because in these cities, they easily get access to funding for their 
business. We conjecture that borrowers are more willing to do offline check if there is an offline 
branch because by doing so, the loan application is likely to be successful (Tao et al, 2017) and 
there is no additional cost. This variable is valid because investors’ decision depends on other 
factors such as interest rate and duration. Other variables include the presence of a mortgage (1/0), 
car loan (1/0), age, income and degree. These variables are proxies for the presence of collateral 
which may influence the likelihood of having a project funded. Similarly, the model implies that 
borrowers with no mortgage and no car loan cannot have access to loans. Since the offline services 
work like banks, they tend to avoid them because they know they have no chance of getting funds. 
Our empirical model is as follows:  
 
Prob(NonOffline = 1) = α0 + α1Mortgage +  α2𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 +  α3𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ +  α4𝐴𝑔𝑒 +
 α5𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 +  α6𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒                                                                                                             (1) 
Prob(FundingSuccess = 1) = β0 + β1LnWordCount +  β2𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 +  β3𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑟𝑒 +
β4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + β5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 +  β6𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  β7𝐿𝑛 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + β8𝐴𝑔𝑒 + β9𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 +
 β10𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒                                                                                                                                   (2) 
No of Bids = γ0 + γ1LnWordCount + γ2𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 +  γ3𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑟𝑒 + γ4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
 γ5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + γ6𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  γ7𝐿𝑛 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 +  γ8𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  γ9𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 +  γ10𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒          (3)                                                                                                                                                                   
(2) and (3) are the main outcome equations and (1) is the sample selection equation. We estimate 
our Heckman selection model using a Maximum Likelihood estimator.  
Trust is our key independent variable in the outcome equations. We use the STATA function 
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ustrregexm to search for words in the project description that are associated trust and 
trustworthiness. The Chinese words we select are “chengshi” (honesty), ”chengxin” 
(integrity), ”kekao” (trustworthy) , “xinyong” (credence) , “kaopu” (reliable) and ”xiangxin” 
(trust). If any of these words appears in the description of the project, the variable trustworthiness 
takes the value of 1; if it does not appear it takes the value of zero. Words of this kind are related 
to the drivers of ‘cognition-based trust’ as opposed to that of ‘affective-based trust’ (e.g. mutual 
understanding, personal relationship, etc.) (McAllister, 1995). McAllister (1995) found that 
cognition-based trust is a precursor of the development of affective-based trust. In addition, in an 
exploratory study examining the meaning of the language of trust as perceived by Chinese 
entrepreneurs, Tan and Chee (2005) found that the frequency count of factors of trustworthiness 
in words of ‘honest’, ‘integrity’, ‘sincerity’, ‘discreetness’ and ‘fairness’ facilitated the 
development of trust among Chinese entrepreneurs. 
We choose the CreditRating by the platform as our moderator. Renrendai will refer to submitted 
documents and determine borrowers’ crediting rating from HR to AA. We code 0 for HR, 1 for E, 
2 for D, 3 for C, 4 for B, 5 for A and 6 for AA.  
Control variables include number of words used to describe the project, education, age, loan 
amount, loan duration and monthly income. A longer text is considered to be a signal of openness 
and transparency from the borrowers’ end of the transaction and therefore we expect that lenders 
are willing to fund loans that are well described and explained (Dorfleitner et al, 2016). In addition, 
the longer text, the more likely positive words could be included. Yet, if the description text is too 
wordy, the investors may not have enough patience to go through all the text. Since they only 
invest a small amount of money, it is not worth to cost much time (Dorfleitner et al, 2016). Taken 
together, we expect a positive association between the number of words and investors’ action.   
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Income indicates income range where n=0(less than 1000RMB), 1 (between 1000 and 2000RMB), 
2(between 2001 and 5000 RMB),3 (between 5001 and 10000 RMB), 4(between 10001 and 20000 
RMB), 5(between 20001 and 50000 RMB), and 6 (over 50000 RMB); Degree indicates the 
education level where n=0 (high school or lower), 1(junior college), 2(undergraduate), and 3 
(master or above); NonOffline is coded one if the listing has not been verified through the offline 
authentication. Among the listings that were not funded, 22% of the project and applicants’ 
description contain words that are related to trustworthiness while the proportion goes down to 3% 
for the projects that were funded. The length of the description of the projects varies among groups 
of projects: the average length of the non-funded projects is equal to 58 words while this goes up 
to 110 words among the funded projects. Interest rates for the two groups of projects tend to be 
different although they are in the region above 10%: more specifically it is equal to 12.6% for the 
projects that were not funded and 11.4% for the projects that were. Credit ratings for the projects 
that have not been funded are on average around HR while these go up to B for projects that have 
been funded. Virtually no funded project has been authenticated offline while around 71% of the 
funded projects have been authenticated offline. The average amount of the awarded loans varies 
between the two groups: it is equal to around 86500RMB for non-funded projects but it is equal to 
59492RMB for the funded ones. The average proposed duration of the non-funded projects is 20 
months while it goes up to 25 months for the funded projects. There is no difference in terms of 
the average income of the project applicants: it is between 5000 and 10000 RMB for both groups 






Table 1. Variables Description and Expected Signs 
Dependent Variables Description Expected Sign 
Funded Code one if the listing is successfully funded Dependent Variable 
Bids Total number of investors in the campaign Dependent Variable 
Non Offline Code one if the listing has not been verified 
through the offline authentication.  
Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables   
Trust  Code one if the borrower mentioned he/she is a 




Credit Rating Renrendai has its own credit rating system from 
the highest risk (HR) to the AA rating. We code 
0 for HR, 1 for E, 2 for D, 3 for C, 4 for B, 5 for 
A and 6 for AA. 
Positive 
Interest Rate The interest rate on listing.  Positive/Negative 
Months The number of months the borrowers would like 
to pay back the loan. 
Positive/Negative 
Income Variables indicating income range where 
n=0(less than 1000RMB), 1 (between 1000 and 
2000RMB), 2(between 2001 and 5000 RMB),3 
(between 5001 and 10000 RMB), 4(between 
10001 and 20000 RMB), 5(between 20001 and 
Positive 
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50000 RMB), and 6 (over 50000 RMB). 
Age The age of the borrower measured in years. Positive 
Degree Variables indicating the education level where 
n=0 (high school or lower), 1(junior college), 
2(undergraduate), and 3 (master or above). 
Positive 
Word Count Number of words used to describe the project Positive 
Amount Total Amount of Money that borrowers request Positive/Negative 
Mortgage Code one if the borrower has the mortgage and 
zero otherwise. 
Positive/Negative 
Car loan Code one if the borrower has a Car loan and zero 
otherwise. 
Positive/Negative 
Branch Code one if there is an offline branch in the 
borrower’s city and zero otherwise 
Negative 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Not Funded Loans 
 Obs Mean Sd min Max 
Word Count 24008 58.52 52.67 4 718 
Credit Rating 24008 0.040 0.320 0 6 
Trust (1/0) 24008 0.220 0.420 0 1 
Amount (RMB) 24008 86500 110000 3000 500000 
Age 24008 30.33 6.160 22 56 
Degree 24008 0.830 0.780 0 3 
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Income 24008 3.060 1.170 0 6 
Interest Rate(%) 24008 12.64 0.680 8 13 
Months 24008 20.14 6.220 3 36 
Non Offline(1/0) 24008 1 0.040 0 1 
 Bids 24008 0 0 0 0 
Mortgage (1/0) 24008 0.118 0.322 0 1 
Car loan (1/0) 24008 0.066 0.249 0 1 
Branch (1/0) 24008 0.434 0.495 0 1 
Funded Loans 
 
     
Word Count 9020 116.8 58.11 19 492 
Credit Rating 9020 4.400 1.510 0 6 
Trust (1/0) 9020 0.0400 0.190 0 1 
Amount (RMB) 9020 59492 33715 3000 250000 
Age 9020 37.16 8.430 20 62 
Degree 9020 0.940 0.760 0 3 
Income 9020 3.610 1.320 0 6 
Interest Rate(%) 9020 11.44 0.960 8 13.20 
Months 9020 25.14 10 3 48 
Non Offline(1/0) 9020 0.290 0.450 0 1 
Bids 9020 59.27 65.89 1 1165 
Mortgage (1/0) 9020 0.354  0.478  0 1 
Car loan (1/0) 9020 0.094 0.292 0 1 
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Branch (1/0) 9020 0.869 0.336 0 1 
Note: Trust is coded 1 if the borrower mentioned he/she is a trustworthy/person in the description; 
RMB is Chinese currency and 1 USD=7 RMB in 2020. 
As for the correlation among the variables, Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients among the 
variables. The correlation coefficients are generally significant while the value of the coefficients 
among the independent variables is not above 0.7 suggesting they can be used in the same model. 
We also check the multicollinearity among the independent variables using the VIF test (see table 
3a) The average VIF is 2.24 and maximum VIF is 6.5. The results show no sign of multicollinearity 
given the rule of thumb is 10.
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Table 3. Correlation coefficients 
 Funded WordCount CreditRating Trust Amount Age Degree Income InterestRate Months NonOffline Branch Bids Mortgage Carloan 
Funded 1                     
Word 
Count 
0.432*** 1              
Credit 
Rating 
0.919*** 0.465*** 1             
Trust -0.217*** 0.050*** -0.248*** 1            
Amount -0.128*** 0.027*** -0.082*** 0.00700 1           
Age 0.406*** 0.233*** 0.432*** -0.118*** 0.129*** 1          
Degree 0.066*** 0.084*** 0.051*** 0.021*** 0.102*** 0.00500 1         
Income 0.198*** 0.194*** 0.210*** -0.049*** 0.332*** 0.253*** 0.041*** 1        
Interest 
Rate 
-0.574*** -0.345*** -0.579*** 0.145*** 0.146*** -0.225*** -0.035*** -0.210*** 1       
Months 0.287*** 0.078*** 0.368*** -0.096*** 0.117*** 0.188*** 0.046*** -0.037*** 0.433*** 1      
Non 
Offline 
-0.795*** -0.238*** -0.870*** 0.224*** 0.053*** -0.383*** -0.021*** -0.131*** 0.397*** -0.457*** 1     
Branch 0.390*** 0.163*** 0.421*** -0.085*** -0.035*** 0.147*** 0.035*** 0.117*** -0.223*** 0.179*** -0.439*** 1    
Bids 0.609*** 0.264*** 0.628*** -0.157*** -0.00400 0.296*** 0.060*** 0.184*** -0.409*** 0.272*** -0.592*** 0.282*** 1   
Mortgage 0.272*** 0.097*** 0.289*** -0.059*** 0.118*** 0.190*** 0.100*** 0.124*** -0.029*** 0.298*** -0.317*** 0.152*** 0.205*** 1  
Car loan 0.047*** 0.00500 0.049*** -0.011** 0.077*** 0.029*** -0.00800 0.143*** -0.00700 0.021*** -0.075*** 0.046*** 0.033*** 0.085*** 1 





Table 3a.   
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
CreditRating 6.5 0.153761 
InterestRate 5.56 0.179714 
Months 4.57 0.218799 
LnWordCount 1.58 0.630975 
LnAmount 1.46 0.686315 
Income 1.37 0.728013 
Age 1.31 0.761237 
Branch 1.22 0.816368 
Trust 1.18 0.843919 
Mortgage 1.18 0.84968 
Trust*CreditRating 1.06 0.941851 
Degree 1.04 0.966134 
Carloan 1.03 0.969032 
Mean VIF 2.24  
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2.4 Results 
Table 4 shows the marginal effects of first step Heckman selection model. The dependent 
variable, Non Offline, is a binary variable indicating whether a borrower engaged in offline 
authentication. Non Offline takes one if the borrowers didn’t choose offline authentication, 
because in second step, we only focus the borrowers without offline authentication. Model 1 is 
the baseline model: the independent variables include an offline branch dummy, Branch, and 
measures of borrowers’ different loan variables such as Mortgage and Carloan. Model 2 
introduces borrower’s Age, Income and Degree obtained as additional independent variables 
choice. 
Table 4. Selection Equation  
DV: NonOffline (1) (2) 
Mortgage -0.184*** -0.139*** 
 (-51.95) (-40.19) 
Carloan -0.046*** -0.048*** 
 (-7.28) (-8.49) 
Branch -0.504*** -0.453*** 
 (-39.03) (-40.19) 
Age  -0.011*** 
  (-63.84) 
Degree  0.001 
  (0.52) 
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Income  0.002** 
  (2.05) 
N 33028 33028 
Pseudo R-square  0.327 0.421 
Log Likelihood (LL)  -10945.278 -9426.570 
Deviance (-2LL or 
Chi square change vs. 
Model 1) 
 -3037.42*** 
The Table shows the average marginal effect of the variables on the NonOffline. Z statistics in 
parentheses;  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In Model 1, if there is an offline branch in borrowers’ location, applicants are more willing to 
conduct offline authentication, so the coefficient of Branch has a negative sign on Non Offline. 
Loan history variables, mortgage and car loan show a similar behaviour so there is a negative 
relationship between loan history variables and Non Offline. In Model 2, Income has a positive 
and significant impact on Non Offline. There is a negative association between Age and Non 
Offline, which means young borrowers are less likely to opt for offline verification. The value 
of the Chi square (-3037.42, p<0.01) at the bottom of table 2 implies that Model 2 has a better 
fit. Hence, we use Model 2 as selection model.  
The results of second step are shown in Table 5. Generally speaking, the Heckman model is 
well-suited because the P-Value of the Wald test from Heckprobit is less than 0.05 for all the 
model specifications. We use hierarchical multiple regression analysis for hypothesis testing. 
The Model 1 consists only three key independent variables. Model 2 and Model 3 add 
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demographic and listing characteristics respectively. Lastly, we add an interaction term, 
Trust*Credit Rating, which is the interaction between trustworthiness and credit rating, in 
Model 4 to test the moderating effect of trustworthiness.  
The coefficients associated to the variable Trustworthiness are positive and significant across 
the different specifications and in general it supports H1a. In other words, applicants who use 
words that are associated to trust tend to be fully funded. When the variable Trustworthiness is 
interacted with the Credit Rating variable (Model 4), the interaction term, Trust*CreditRating, 
is still positive and significant i.e. for applicants that use words associated to Trust, there exists 
a net positive association between Credit rating and funding success (confirming H2a). Norton 
et al (2004)’ command, inteff, cannot be applied to this study as we use Heckprobit to estimate 
the models. However, we have calculated the marginal effects of the interaction term manually 
using STATA. As a result, the marginal effects are shown in all Tables. 
Results suggest that borrowers who do not choose offline authentication, all things being equal, 
are more likely to be funded if they frame their message around the concept of trust. Consistent 
with the findings of Lin et al. (2013), the probability of funding success increases with the 
credit rating (P<0.01) in all model specifications. Natural logarithm of the number of words 
(LnWordCount) is also positive and statistically significant in all model specification.  
Demographic variables, Age, Degree and Income are in general positive and significant (Tao 
et al., 2017). As for the characteristics of the applicants, the older the applicant, the higher its 
income and the more qualified it is more likely it is to obtain funds. In terms of the other control 
variables, the amount of the requested loan has a negative impact on funding success. The 
interest rate is positively associated to the funding success. Variables associated to the 
characteristics of the listings (such as InterestRate, Months and LnAmount), are highly 
significant and the marginal effects are in line with our expectation. Higher interest rates attract 
lenders and increase probability of funding success. LnAmount is negative and significant, 
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implying that P2P investors tend to bid on small loans and diversify the risk. When the loan 
amount increases, lenders are suspicious about the borrowers’ ability to repay the loan, thereby 
decreasing the probability of funding success (Herzenstein et al, 2008). In contrast with the 
finding of Tao et al (2017), we find entrepreneurial loan duration has a significantly negative 
impact on funding success, suggesting lenders perceive long-term entrepreneurial loans are 
risky. Lastly in Model 4, we test the moderating effect of the credit rating by interacting trust 
language with credit rating. This interaction term, Trust*CreditRating, is positive and highly 
significant (P<0.01), confirming our hypothesis.  
Table 5. Outcome Equation: Probability of being funded.  
DV: Funded (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LnWordCount 0.003** 0.002* 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 (2.37) (1.78) (5.57) (6.00) 
CreditRating 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
 (41.12) (41.25) (28.55) (28.04) 
Trust 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006** -0.004 
 (3.12) (2.98) (2.25) (-1.23) 
Age  0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
  (3.92) (9.42) (9.28) 
Degree  0.008*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
  (7.02) (10.09) (9.83) 
Income  0.001 0.018*** 0.018*** 
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  (0.72) (13.56) (13.43) 
LnAmount   -0.052*** -0.054*** 
   (-21.67) (-21.36) 
InterestRate   0.017*** 0.014*** 
   (5.25) (4.29) 
Months   -0.003*** -0.002*** 
   (-6.98) (-6.10) 
Trust*CreditRating    0.036*** 
    (7.30) 
N 33022 33022 33022 33022 
P-Value Wald test of 
Indep. 
0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04 
The Table shows the average marginal effect of the variables on the funding probability. Z 
statistics in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
In the last batch of results, we test whether message framing matters for the number of bids 
associated to each project. Empirically, the model is similar to the one estimated above 
although the dependent variable is now a continuous one (i.e. not a dummy variable). The 
results are presented in Table 6. While the signs and the coefficients of the control variables 
are similar to those presented in Table 5, our key independent variable is not significant jointly 




Table 6. Outcome Equation: Number of Bids 
DV: Bids (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LnWordCount 0.460*** 0.364*** 0.398*** 0.387*** 
 (3.30) (2.59) (2.84) (2.76) 
CreditRating 9.278*** 9.203*** 7.226*** 7.256*** 
 (106.53) (103.74) (48.30) (47.91) 
Trust -0.197 -0.190 -0.143 -0.082 
 (-0.91) (-0.88) (-0.66) (-0.37) 
Age  0.018 0.025* 0.026* 
  (1.30) (1.78) (1.81) 
Degree  0.445*** 0.447*** 0.453*** 
  (4.05) (4.06) (4.11) 
Income  0.274*** 0.342*** 0.343*** 
  (3.65) (4.15) (4.16) 
LnAmount   -0.228** -0.230** 
   (-2.20) (-2.22) 
InterestRate   -5.025*** -4.989*** 
   (-15.99) (-15.81) 
Months   0.464*** 0.459*** 
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   (13.10) (12.91) 
Trust*CreditRating    -0.676 
    (-1.25) 
N 33022 33022 33022 33022 
P-Value Wald test of 
Indep. 
0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 
The Table shows the average marginal effect of the variables on the Number of Bids. Z 
statistics in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
2.5 Robustness Check 
2.5.1 Sentiment Analysis 
Sentiment analysis is able to identify and mine positive/negative opinions and emotions that 
are derived from the text (Wilson et al., 2005). The words in borrowers’ loan description 
contain both positive and negative sentiment. Since the objective of this study is to mine the 
way that borrowers ask for a loan by analyzing their positive loan descriptions, it is appropriate 
to identify borrowers’ sentiment orientation and extract the positive description (Zuo et al., 
2019). Following Zuo et al (2019), Guo et al (2019) and Zhang et al (2017), we conduct 
sentiment analysis by using SnowNLP, a Chinese natural language processing library in Python. 
This library has similar functions as TextBlob (a Python library for English textual data), such 
as word segmentation, part-of-speech tagging, text abstraction, and sentiment analysis.  For 
each input loan description, SnowNLP can predict the sentiment orientation of the text by built-
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in Chinese dictionary. The dictionary is constructed by SnowNLP developers5. The developers 
collect sentences from microblogs and online reviews and define these sentences as positive or 
negative languages. The precision rate of SnowNPL to identify emotional tendencies of social 
media texts is over 80% (Zhang et al, 2018). The accuracy of TextBlob in Tweets is 76% 
(Hasan et al., 2018) 
Although SnowNLP allows users to apply their own dictionaries, to eliminate self-selection 
bias derived from using self-chosen dictionary, we choose to use built-in dictionary. In addition, 
as borrowers post their words online and online words-of-mouth shares similar unique features6, 
SnowNLP built-in dictionary is well-suited for our analysis. In fact, the algorithm that 
SnowNLP uses is a Naive Bayes algorithm, a probability model for binary classification.  
Hence, SnowNLP output value is between 0 and 1 which implies the probability of the 
description being positive emotion. The higher value indicates the higher probability of positive 
sentiment. For example, one description is as follows ‘‘I found an investment opportunity so I 
need funding. My monthly income is RMB 3000. I have a house and good borrowing history. 
I will use my salary and the return from the investment to pay back the loan.’’ The emotional 
value evaluated by SnowNLP is 0.999, which means the probability of being positive emotion 
is 99.9%. 
We use two loan description to show the degree to which SnowNLP can predict sentiment 
index of a negative prefix such as not before positive words. For example, the sentiment index 
of “I have some spare time after work so I would like to apply my first loan here to do some 
small business. I have no idea whether it is trustworthy or not trustworthy (in English, we may 
omit last trustworthy but in Chinese, we keep it) so I just try a small amount of money. I am 
                                                          
5  For an open source Python package in sentiment analysis, see https://github.com/isnowfy/snownlp for details. The 
positive/negative language dictionaries and detailed codes to calculate sentiment index are public on the developers’ website. 
6 Yang (2007) suggests internet community enables language innovation so their writing system is different from other places. 
For example, huichang (灰常) is for feichang (非常), which means “very much”.  
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working at Changsha and have bought a 150 square feet flat in my hometown.” is 0.37 while 
the probability of “I am a civil servant, working at local Justice Bureau and I am deputy head 
of the department. I have a stable job with monthly income of RMB 8000. I don’t have bad 
habits. The purpose of this loan is to invest in a shop but there is no enough money. I am a 
trustworthy person and a veteran cadre at my workplace. I can make sure to repay the loan on 
time” is 0.97. From these examples we can see that SnowNLP is able to identify a negative 
prefix and treat them differently.    
Table 7 shows the results of sentiment analyses. Sentiment is a continuous variable, predicted 
by SnowNLP directly. Model (1) shows it is positive and significant at 10% level. 
Sentiment*CreditRating is an interaction between Sentiment and CreditRating. Model (2) 
shows Sentiment*CreditRating is positive and significant at 1% level. To further confirm our 
results, following Zhang et al (2017)’s procedure, we first set the threshold to 0.6. If output 
value for loan description is higher than 0.6, we classify them as positive description. When 
the sentiment score is lower than 0.6, Zhang et al (2017) consider it neutral or negative. So, 
Sentiment0.6 is a dummy variable, which takes one if loan description shows a positive 
sentiment and 0 otherwise. Model (3) and (4) show the results of Sentiment0.6 and its 
interaction term with CreditRating respectively. Both are positive and significant at 5% level. 
In an additional robustness test, we set our threshold to 0.7, which means only if the positive 
possibility is higher than 70%, we consider it positive sentiment. This criterion is more 
restrictive than the previous one. The results are shown in Model (5) and Model (6) and are 
qualitatively the same.  
 
Table 7. Sentiment Analysis 
DV: Funded (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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LnWordCount 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 (6.22) (5.87) (6.22) (5.90) (6.18) (5.87) 
CreditRating 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 













 (-20.55) (-14.95) (-20.84) (-14.98) (-20.94) (-15.04) 
Age 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (9.31) (8.60) (9.33) (8.59) (9.33) (8.58) 
Degree 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 
 (10.00) (8.99) (10.22) (8.99) (10.04) (8.99) 
Income 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 
 (13.23) (11.17) (13.33) (11.18) (13.35) (11.18) 
InterestRate 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 













 (-7.00) (-6.82) (-7.02) (-6.74) (-7.02) (-6.70) 
Sentiment 0.006** 0.002     
 (2.02) (0.60)     
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Sentiment*CreditRating  0.013***     
  (3.22)     
Sentiment0.6   0.005** 0.003   
   (2.27) (1.16)   
Sentiment0.6*CreditRating    0.008***   
    (2.59)   
Sentiment0.7     0.004* 0.002 
     (1.89) (0.88) 
Sentiment0.7*CreditRating      0.007** 
      (2.33) 
N 33028 33028 33028 33028 33028 33028 
P-Value Wald test of Indep. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
The Table shows the average marginal effect of the variables on the funding probability. Z 
statistics in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
2.5.2 Subsample Analysis  
In addition, we conduct subsample analysis to check the robustness of our findings. We divide 
our sample into two subsamples based on borrowers’ location, i.e. the coastal region and the 
rest of China. The coastal region, including Heibei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Shanghai, Guangdong, Hainan and Fujian, is China’s growth hub as opposed to the 
rest of the country. The results are shown in Table 8. The Model (1) and (2) are the coastal-
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provinces group. The coefficient of trust is not significant in this group while the interaction 
term of trust and credit rating is positive and significant. Non-coastal-provinces group is shown 
in the Model (3) and (4). Both trust and the interaction are positive and significant in this group. 
It is noteworthy that we cannot reject the test of independent equations for all the subsample 
analysis. This means the selection equation and outcome equation can be estimated separately 
and our finding still holds.  
Table 8. Subsample Analysis 
DV: Funded (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LnWordCount 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
 (4.40) (4.59) (3.24) (3.68) 
CreditRating 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 (21.40) (20.93) (18.44) (18.27) 
Trust 0.002 -0.007 0.010*** -0.001 
 (0.51) (-1.57) (2.65) (-0.29) 
LnAmount -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.048*** -0.052*** 
 (-16.38) (-16.21) (-14.09) (-13.86) 
Age 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (5.96) (5.87) (7.69) (7.64) 
Degree 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 (5.64) (5.34) (8.45) (8.41) 
Income 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
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 (11.11) (11.02) (7.05) (6.98) 
InterestRate 0.012*** 0.009** 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 (2.71) (1.96) (4.26) (3.72) 
Months -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (-4.77) (-4.07) (-4.80) (-4.32) 
Trust*CreditRating  0.035***  0.038*** 
  (4.83)  (5.60) 
N 16234 16234 16788 16788 
P-Value Wald test of 
Indep. 
0.63 0.70 0.94 0.91 
The Table shows the average marginal effect of the variables on the funding probability. Z 
statistics in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
2.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
 
The findings of this study demonstrate that a positively framed message has a significant 
influence on funding success but not on the number of bids. Our results try to reconcile 
contrasting findings in the context of online reviews (e.g. Ludwig et al., 2013; Salehan and 
Kim, 2016) by showing that message framing matters in the case of Internet-mediated 
transactions.  Specifically, this study shows that the content of a borrower’s message and how 
it is framed using language is positively correlated to funding decisions but not to the number 
of bids. Theoretically, we have combined message framing theory with signalling theory to 
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show that language can be a powerful signalling device even if the message is mediated by 
technological devices (like platforms or online sites). 
 
Our findings are also consistent with research in marketing which has shown that framing has 
a much stronger effect when consumers have little or no related product experience (Chang, 
2007). In this sense, our findings imply that message framing can be useful when investors 
have no familiarity with potential borrowers which are working towards obtaining funds on 
P2P lending platforms. In addition, our study contributes to the studies showing the 
ineffectiveness of cheap signals in generating new funding streams (e.g. Chen et al., 2009). In 
P2P lending context, investors may hold more limited knowledge and skills for assessing the 
various costly signals associated with qualities of a borrower, which may justify the importance 
of language as a cheap signal in P2P lending decisions. In this way, our study also builds on 
the main tenet of traditional signaling theory which suggests that cheap signals make it 
impossible to create a separating equilibrium between better and worse signalers (Balvers et 
al., 2014).  
 
Importantly, our findings show the complementary role of costly and cheap signals in 
generating funding success. In particular, they reveal that costly signals including individual 
credit scores (or ratings) are complemented with cheap signals (such as positively framed 
messages) to generate insights into the quality of the potential borrowers. This finding 
contributes to the literature examining external signals in isolation, and thus has responded to 
the call for research on the interaction of different signals on certain performance outcomes 
(Anglin et al., 2018). While some studies suggest that observable actions (i.e. costly signals) 
are mostly considered to be a more credible signalling mechanism compared to pure words 
(Cheung et al., 2014). Our finding is consistent with the limited number of studies which 
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suggest that while costly signals are beneficial on funding success, cheap signals enhance these 
benefits by providing an effective form of communication between entrepreneurs and funders 
(Davis and Allison, 2013). Such communication is particularly important in virtual 
environments, in which impression formation based on face-to-face interactions and 
experiences is lacking. The costly signals reduce the risks of cheating and any costs associated 
with misleading signals (Connely et al., 2011). However, the costs of relying exclusively on 
costly signals and assessing them may be high. As such, the complementary use of cheap 




2.6.2 Implications for Practitioners  
This study suggests that message framing as a cheap signal can be effective in enhancing the 
likelihood of a project being funded. In particular, messages framed in a way to signal 
trustworthiness of potential borrowers have greater likelihood for funding success. Potential 
borrowers signaling messages for P2P lenders need to frame their messages with words such 
as honesty, integrity, credence, and reliable which signal their trustworthiness quality. Besides 
trustworthiness, potential borrowers can also display other qualities through language to attract 
investors and increase the potential for funding success. For example, signaling words 
associated with the agility, proactiveness, ambiguousness, empathy and network size of a 
potential borrower may support lenders’ decisions on whether the borrower is worth investing. 
In this sense, message framing can be very relevant.   
 
Furthermore, as suggested by our findings, to enhance the odds of funding success, costly 
signals such as information on the credit rating of a potential borrower can be complemented 
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by suitably framed message embedded in the description of the project. This is because, when 
a borrower communicates their credit rating through objectively assessed evidence, their 
continuous emphasis on their credit history may only have a supplementary role, and thus have 
marginal additional influence on their funding success. If borrowers seeking for funds can 
enhance their communication mode through the use of positive messages, their qualities, which 
can be objectively assessed, would be supported through language, and therefore increase the 
likelihood of being funded. 
 
 
2.6.3 Limitations of the Study and Future Research 
 
This research has only focused on the use of language as a cheap signal on funding success. 
Future studies can focus on how message framing reflecting the qualities of potential borrowers 
can be complemented with other types of cheap signals such as message length and the format 
of writing to influence the funding success (Li and Zhan, 2011). In addition, this study only 
examined the role of message framing as a cheap signal that can motivate investors to fund the 
project. Future studies can investigate whether negative language may attract the attention of 
investors and how it may affect their decisions. For example, studies can investigate whether 
negatively framed messages explaining the risks of funding other types of borrowers competing 
for the same investor’s resource or the negative messages about the competitors may be 
effective in attracting the attention of investors and enhance the odds of funding success. 
Specifically, future studies can use sentiment analysis to understand how creating negative 
emotions about the competing actors may affect a borrower’s success of obtaining funds. 
Importantly, this study focused on borrower-related issues at the individual level from only the 
borrower perspective. Future research can use a multi-level study to analyze how individual-
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related and environmental issues, from both borrower and investor perspective, may affect 
funding performance of potential borrowers. Finally, this study only focused on the extent to 
which message framing may moderate the effect of credit rating of a borrower as a costly signal 
on their funding performance. Future studies can investigate the moderating effects of other 
types of cheap signals such as entrepreneurship orientation of a borrower on various types of 
costly signals including their education, credit history and existing resources. An important 
issue to highlight here is the extent to which these results can be generalized to other platforms 
and more importantly, whether it is possible to conduct similar studies that use data from 
different platforms. Crucially, P2P platforms in China use different business models and in this 
respect merging data from several platforms cannot offer useful insights as in reality the data 
generating processes are different because of the way the platforms are run. In this respect, a 
useful exercise is not so much to increase the volume of data analyzed by merging different 
datasets but to ascertain whether in platforms with different business models, message framing 




This study has examined the role of message framing suggesting that the borrower is 
trustworthy in their funding success in terms of the likelihood of a project being funded. In 
addition, the study has investigated the extent to which it moderates the effect of credit rating 
information of a borrower as a costly signal on their funding success. The study has confirmed 
that positive message framing emphasizing the trustworthiness of a borrower is associated to 
funding success. The study also found that message framing and costly signals (like credit 




Chapter 3 Psychological distancing and Language intensity in P2P lending 
Abstract 
The study bridges the P2P lending literature and psycholinguistics literature and set out to 
explain how psychological distancing manifested by linguistic styles can influence lenders’ 
decision on P2P funding campaign. We find that linguistic styles related to psychological 
distancing have a negative impact on P2P funding success. Moreover, the language intensity 
tends to strengthen the negative relationship between psychological distancing and funding 
success. This finding is consistent with psycholinguistics literature which suggests that 
psychological distancing is associated with negative interpersonal outcome (Simmons et al, 
2005; Revenstorf et al, 1984). Specifically, the number of “you” and the number of negations 
used in borrowers’ description are negatively related to the willingness of the lender to support 
the funding campaign. The intensive language negatively strengths the relationship between 
the funding performance and number of “you” but does not apply to number of negations.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
P2P lending has become an important source of funds for consumers and entrepreneurs. 
Consumers can use the funds for education, house purchasing or wedding ceremony. It is also 
important for entrepreneurs to fund their startup. This is particularly important in China 
because the banks are more willing to provide loans to State Owned enterprise and private 
business finds difficult to borrow money from banks (Fungacova and Weill, 2014).  
This study examines the effect of psychological distancing arised from communication on the 
funding campaign. More specifically, we investigate whether psychological distancing in 
communication discourages P2P lending contributions. We selected this setting for several 
reasons. Firstly, P2P lending is the most important form of crowdfunding (Saiedi et al., 2020). 
Second, a successful funding campaign requires support from the crowd. Psychological 
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distance in borrowers’ communication affects the perceptions of the crowd and therefore, 
influences the campaign outcome. A sense of closeness by the crowd may promote the 
contributions. There are four dimensions of psychological distance including spatial distance, 
social distance, temporal distance and hypothetical distance, which suggests mind goes away 
from what is in front of right now. They are different dimensions of psychological distance 
because these constructs of consideration makes people feel psychologically distant (Maglio 
2020). If something is psychologically distant (e.g., far away in temporal, spatial , probabilistic 
or social distance), people feel psychological distancing in a subjective sense (Maglio 2020).   
Given the fact that P2P lending takes place in online settings, communication between lenders 
and borrowers is a challenge. Unlike offline interactions, narratives of the borrower plays a key 
role in online communication process. Anglin et al (2018) suggest the backers who support the 
funding campaign form assessments or make judgments relying on the narrative. The 
entrepreneurship literature shows how the entrepreneurs form the message matters as the 
narrations help them to acquire essential resources by setting expected outcomes and conveying 
value (Huang et al., 2020; Martens et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009). Therefore, researchers have 
showed a great deal of interests in the role of language in crowdfunding and entrepreneurial 
finance literature (Defazio et al., 2020; Huang et al., 2020; Parhankangas and Renko, 2017; 
Larrimore et al., 2011).  
A stream of literature has investigated the association between language and funding outcome 
in different types of crowdfundings including reward-based crowdfunding (Parhankangas and 
Renko, 2017; Anglin et al., 2018), equity-based crowdfunidng (Block et al., 2018) and P2P 
lending (Herzenstein et al., 2011; Allison et al., 2013; Majumdar and Bose, 2018). In different 
funding campaigns, borrowers’ narratives normally focus on various aspects. In reward-based 
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crowdfunding, the narratives often center on new product development plan7, while in P2P 
lending, borrowers tend to stress on evidence-based elements because personal details and loan 
characteristics can appeal more lenders (Lee et al., 2019; Allison et al., 2013). Nevertheless, 
most of extant studies mentioned above focus on the content of the language. However, a few 
studies related to linguistic styles, measured by use of some style words found lenders form 
perceptions about prospective borrowers based on the style words and therefore style words 
can actually influence lenders’ decision (Herzenstein et al., 2011; Larrimore et al., 2011).  
Although some aspects of linguistic styles have been studied, the linguistic styles that are 
related to psychological distancing are scarce with one exception of Parhankangas and Renko 
(2017). We follow Parhankangas and Renko (2017) and define Psychological distancing is to 
the extent to which people distance or remove themselves away from the topic being discussed. 
They discuss psychological distancing and crowdfunding success for social entrepreneurs. The 
construal-level theory (CLT) provides a theoretical framework to understand psychological 
distancing (García et al., 2020). The CLT suggests the consequences of psychological 
distancing is reduced affective concern and people have a weaker affective response to distant 
stimuli (Williams et al., 2014). To build personal rapport from the crowd, it is advised that 
entrepreneurs’ use of language should avoid psychological distancing (Parhankangas and 
Renko, 2017). Due to different focus of entrepreneurial narratives in P2P lending, it is 
necessary to investigate how P2P lenders react to perception of psychological distancing. 
Moreover, the language intensity that related to tone of communication can also affect the 
funding outcome (Han et al., 2018). Language intensity has been first studies since the seminal 
work of Bowers (1963). Following Clementson et al.(2016) and Bowers (1963), we define 
                                                          
7 The plan usually tells the investors within three or six months, they can deliver their 
products to the market.  
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language intensity8 as language implying direction and degree of distance from neutrality9. 
Drawing on language expectancy theory (LET), we suggest language intensity moderates the 
effect of psychological distancing on funding success. To date, researchers have studied these 
two factors in isolation. Yet, linguistic styles and language intensity are actually inseparable. 
How tone of communication complements linguistic styles to form the perception is still 
unknown even though lenders receive both together. In addition, scholars tend to pay attention 
to how positive linguistic styles improve likelihood of funding success. Extant literature largely 
ignores the negative effect of some linguistic styles such as psychological distancing on 
funding outcomes (Huang et al., 2020). Given the fact that the important role of psychological 
linguistic styles on online context (Ludwig et al., 2013; Peng et al., 2004) and there are still 
rich features that can be studied (Lee et al., 2019), we try to explore how psychological 
distancing affects P2P funding outcomes and how language intensity strengthen this 
relationship.  
The CLT provides a theoretical framework to understand psychological distancing (García et 
al., 2020). To examine the effect of psychological distancing on P2P lending, we draw upon 
construal-level theory (CLT) as a theoretical base (Trope and Liberman 2003, 2010; Williams 
et al., 2014 ). In addition, Language expectancy theory (LET) posits language intensity 
interacting with other factors will determine persuasion power of the message (Burgoon et al., 
2002). Hence, drawing on LET, we test the moderating role of language intensity on the 
relationship between psychological distancing and P2P funding performance. We use data from 
one of the leading Chinese P2P platform, Renrendai, to perform our empirical analysis. To 
alleviate sample selection bias, we also adopt a Heckman two stage model. The results show 
                                                          
8 High intensity language includes emotion-laden words such as horrible and excellent, which 
suggests the extreme position and deviation from the neutrality (Bowers, 1963).  
9 There are two linguistic ways to deviate from the neutrality: 1) directness toward the 
audience and 2) use of emotion-laden words (Bradac et al., 1979) 
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that the psychological distancing in the description of the project negatively predicts the 
funding success. The result is consistent with psycholinguistics literature that suggests 
psychological distancing is associated with negative interpersonal relationship. We also 
contribute to the literature by extending CLT to an emerging lending market. Moreover, 
language intensity partial enhances the negative effect of psychological distancing on funding 
success. We contribute to the literature by finding the empirical support for LET.  
 
3.2 Theoretical background and Hypothesis Development 
 
CLT proposes an individual’s perception of psychological distance to a stimulus (a person, an 
event or an object) determines the stimulus is mentally represented or construed. If the 
psychological distance is high to a stimulus, individuals tend to form an abstract of this stimulus 
that focuses on its general meaning (Trope and Liberman 2003, 2010). In addition, the CLT 
also argues that the consequences of psychological distancing is reduced affective concern 
(Williams et al., 2014). Transactions online in particular are more likely to be driven by 
affective concerns (Han et al., 2007). Maglio (2020) posits the mind and the body join together 
in dealing with affective information while psychological distance has an increasingly nuanced 
relationship with the affect. A sense of psychological closeness promote the affective response 
of the transaction, while, psychological distant mindset undermines affective elements 
(Williams et al., 2014). For example, when making judgments or choices, such as feelings of 
satisfaction with a specific product or feelings of empathy that promotes charitable giving, 
psychological distance can weaken the affective reactions to these events (Williams et al., 
2014). Moreover, Homer and Yoon (1992) suggest that affective and cognitive states of 
persuasion are complementary rather than separate. This implies that affective elements may 
influence cognitive response which emerges from the perceived ability and competence of the 
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other party (Huang et al., 2020; Lee and Van Dolen, 2015). In sum, based on CLT, we argue 
psychological distance can discourage the P2P lending transactions between the parties.  
The words we use on a daily basis consist of both content words and style words (Abe, 2011; 
Toma and D'Angelo, 2015). Content words such as adjectives, verbs and nouns can carry much 
of the meaning, while style words or linguistic style 10  are related to how information is 
conveyed. Linguistic style are made of articles, auxiliary verbs, prepositions, conjunctions, 
pronouns and negations (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010; Toma and D'Angelo, 2015). Style 
words account for 55% of total words we normally use although they only represent 0.04% of 
all words (Pennebaker, 2011; Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010). Moreover, human’s brain 
processes content words and style words differently (Miller, 1995).  
Linguistic style is more likely to be associated with the measures of individuals’ social and 
psychological worlds than content (Pennebaker and Chung, 2013; Tausczik and Pennebaker, 
2010), as style of communication may contribute to appeal to an audience for communicators 
(Parhankangas and Renko, 2017). Extant research shows that the frequency of certain style 
words is associated with how we are perceived by others and has an impact on outcomes such 
as academic performance and funding campaign of social entrepreneurs (Robinson et al.,2013; 
Parhankangas and Renko, 2017; Fausey and Boroditsky, 2010). Furthermore, Larrimore et al 
(2011) find stylistic features of messages can be effect in assessment of source trustworthiness 
especially in an online environment where social cues such nod and smile about the information 
source are less reachable. In an analysis of linguistic style of Chinese social media, intensive 
use of negations11 can attract great number of readership (Wang, 2019).  We therefore expect 
that P2P lenders are also sensitive to the use of linguistic styles of entrepreneurs.  
                                                          
10 Style words or linguistic style are interchangeable in this study. 
11 For example, “No matter you believe or not, I do not believe.” There are three negations in 
this sentence.   
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It is possible that entrepreneurs disconnect/connect to their potential lenders on an emotional 
level by unconscious use of certain style words that influence psychological distance because 
certain language use can distance away relationships (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010). In 
addition, research suggests that psychological distance is embedded in language use (Nook et 
al., 2017). The use of style words implies temporal and social “present” such as present-tense 
verbs and first person pronouns (Mehl et al., 2013; Pennebaker and King, 1999). Toma and 
Hancock (2012) suggest linguistically, psychological distancing manifest itself by a decrease 
in first person pronouns and an increase in negations. Psychological distancing may alienate 
the entrepreneurs who launch the funding campaign on a P2P platform from their crowd 
(Parhankangas and Renko, 2017). Similarly, Mehl et al. (2013) suggest considering 
psychological implication of language use in different communication context is important. 
For example, Tidwell and Walther (2002) find that interactive strategies that commonly 
employed to close the psychological distance in face-to-face context are less effective in online 
settings. So, people are likely to pay attention to the subtle but important information that is 
conveyed by linguistic style available online because of lack of common cues to get to know 
each other (Flanagin, 2007).We argue that avoiding psychological distancing is more essential 
for entrepreneurs in P2P platform. Entrepreneurs’ ability to payback loan relies on the cash 
inflow generated by their business while other borrowers with stable employment and income 
are more attractive to the lenders in P2P website.  
Lenders associate emotionality of reduced affective concerns with psychological distance 
(Lundberg et al., 1972; Nook et al., 2017; Van Boven et al., 2010). When people make 
decisions for a stimulus that is psychologically close, they consider more emotion-related 
information than when they make same decisions regarding a stimulus that lies at a greater 
psychological distance (Williams et al., 2014). For example, borrowers try to appeal to 
audiences when they list their information on the P2P platform, which can be achieve 
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affectively. Huang et al (2020) show the borrowers’ self-description that trust-related words 
will positively influence lenders’ affective trust. In fact, through their investigation, most of 
descriptions evoke positive emotions. Therefore, if the psychological distance is high, the P2P 
borrowers’ appealing will be less effective. Against this background, we hypothesize:  
 
H1. Psychological distancing is negatively related to funding success.  
 
 
Moderating role of Language intensity  
Another theory that is related to style of words is LET. LET centers on how message features 
such as word choice and sentence structure, positively or negatively violate the expectation 
forming of the recipients (Averbeck, 2014). It also posits that the persuasion power of the 
message may depend on intensity of the message interacting with other factors and predicts 
how language intensity interacts expectation to enhance/reduce persuasion effect (Burgoon et 
al., 2002). Positive violations are exceeding the expectations, which will cause greater attitude 
change and enhance the persuasiveness of the message while negative violations means the 
failure to meet the expectations and result in an opposite effect. 
Drawing on LET, we argue language intensity strengthen the negative relationship between 
psychological distancing and funding success. Bowers (1963) posits the extremities in use of 
words produce a moderating effect and conclude that language intensity has to be treated as a 
complex variable that is subject to interactions with other variables. We propose when the 
psychological distance is high, the high language intensity will push the distance further and 
result in unpleasant interpersonal outcomes. This is because high intensity is likely to 
negatively violate the expectation of the lenders, which causes an opposite effect. In P2P 
lending market, borrowers are expected to present evidence-based element objectively (Lee et 
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al., 2019; Allison et al., 2013) rather than use high intensity language to persuade lenders. In 
an internet-mediated transaction environment, the participants are only allowed narrow 
bandwidth12 (Jensen et al., 2013). If their narrative deviates from narrow bandwidth, this will 
cause expectancy violations and therefore affect lenders’ decision. In an experimental analysis, 
Jensen et al., (2013) find online product reviews with high language intensity are more likely 
to cause a negative language expectancy violation, which in turn reduces credibility. The P2P 
platform can be regarded as an online financial product market, which shares similar features 
and expectancy with other online markets.  
Drawing on LET, most of extant research investigates the moderating effect of language 
intensity on source characteristics and persuasiveness. The source characteristics the literature 
studied focus on gender or other demographic characteristics (Burgoon et al., 2002). There are 
rich characteristics that can be and should be studied in the persuasion process. When the 
borrowers ask for funding in P2P platform, they may want the money desperately and use high-
intensity language. Lenders’ expectancy may be negatively violated. Meanwhile, lenders 
perceive psychological distancing from the style words the borrowers choose and this can 
influence leaders’ decision on the campaign. Both language intensity and psychological 
distancing are embedded in P2P borrowers’ description. Given the literature suggests high 
language intensity are more likely to cause a negative language expectancy violation, we argue 
that language intensity will enhance the negative relationship. Against this background, we 
hypothesize: 
 
H2. Language intensity negatively moderately the negative relationship between psychological 
distancing and funding success.  
                                                          
12 Following Burgoon (1995) and Burgoon and Miller (1985), we define bandwidth a range 
of persuasion strategies that can be effective in senders’ persuasion attempt. 
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3.3 Research Setting 
 
Renrendai is one of the largest P2P platforms operating in Mainland China and many papers 
use Renrendai’s data due to representativeness (Mi and Zhu, 2017; Tao et al, 2017; Yao et 
al,2019; Li and Hu , 2019; Ding et al, 2018). Renrendai was established in 2010 and registered 
capital is 100 million RMB. In January 2014, Renrendai acquired venture capital (130 million 
dollar) from TrustBridge Partners. Until Oct 2018, the accumulative transaction reaches 71.4 
Billion RMB (Renrendai.com). Now it has been ranked 2nd by wdzj.com among all 1881 P2P 
platforms in China. The loan application process in Renrendai is as following. Frist, borrowers 
submit their application form with their national ID number and other personal information. 
They would need to specify the requested loan amount, the interest rate they would like to pay, 
the duration they will pay back the loan, the purpose of borrowing and any other information 
they find helpful to their application. The platform will then access their ID, mobile number, 
address, employment, income and etc. it is suggested by the platform to disclose additional 
information such as education qualification, car and house ownership, marital status and other 
professional certification to promote their credit rating. At the end, the platform will verify the 
information submitted by applicants and assign a credit grade to the applicant. Each credit 
grade corresponds different credit rating from HR (high risk) to AA (very safe). The loan 
application process is very similar among Chinese P2P platforms. Although some major 
platforms such as Paipaidai encourage applicants upload photos and declare friendship, they 
all use in-house credit rating to classify borrowers. Establishing in-house credit rating requires 
information from submitted documents.  
As mentioned above, due to lack of reliable personal credit rating agency, Chinese P2P 
platforms rely heavily on offline authentication to reassure investors. Renren dai cooperates 
with Ucredit (www.ucredit.com), an offline verification company, to do physical site check. 
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After physical visiting to home and working address, Ucredit will then tell Renrendai the 
qualified borrowers. All borrowers recommended by Ucredit will be assigned A class credit 
rating when their application listing online. Ucredit not only acts as an offline partner of 
Renrendai, it but also operates as an independent Micro Finance company. They provide money 
mainly for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which have financial constraints. They are 
experienced in dealing with loan applicants’ materials.  At beginning of the operating, 
Renrendai adopted a pure online model similar to US platforms. Yet, because of severe 
asymmetric information issue in China, Renrendai has no choice but to start offline services in 
order to alleviate the issue. The platform makes profits by offering the matching services 
among borrowers and lenders. According to the credit rating, borrowers need to pay a premium 
from 0% to 5%. Apart from that, there is a 0.3% annual service fee based on outstanding loan 
principal. If the listing is unsuccessful, there is no any fees for borrowers. Renrendai only does 
not charge originated fees from investors. The investors will be charged only if they wish to 
pull their money out ahead of agreement date.  Although collateralized P2P model is 
increasingly popular in China during recent years, loans in Renrendai are all uncollateralized. 
The loan terms are up to 3 years and loan size is range from 3000 RMB to 500,000RMB. 
Renrendai guarantees the principal of investors will be paid back. To do so, the platform 
established a reserve fund to cover the default and the late payment. The fund is topped up 
constantly by the service fees charged. At the meantime, the platform will try to recover the 
loan by emailing, texting and calling the borrowers. If the platform fails to collect back the 
loan, a collection agency will step in. When the money is collected, the platform will put it into 
reserve fund. 
3.4 Data Description 
Our data is retrieved from Renrendai platform and refer to all the listings between 1 Jan 2015 
and 31 Dec 2015. We only focus on the loans that will be used to fund a start-up-related activity 
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(based on the listing title). There are 43824 listings in our dataset. After deleting missing values, 
our dataset of made of 33028 listings. Among them, 9020 listings are fully funded. Each listing 
has a set of information available to potential investors when they made their investment 
decisions. These information include (1) the loan characteristics such as interest rate, loan 
amount, loan duration, credit and financial information, (2) demographic information such as 
gender, age, education background, marital status, employment status, personal income and 
employment status and so on and (3) loan description which is borrowers’ narratives. To test 
the borrowers’ choice of offline authentication and mitigate the sample selection bias, we use 
Branch as dependent variable. We create Branch which is equal to one if borrowers’ location 
has an offline branch to do physical check and zero, otherwise. This is also a proxy for financial 
accessibility. People who live in some Chinese major cities are better off because in these cities, 
they easily get access to funding for their business. We conjecture that borrowers are not willing 
to do offline check if there is no offline branch in their city although by doing so, loan 
application is more likely to be successful (Tao et al, 2017) and there is no additional cost.  
 
Our main dependent variable is funding success. The Funded is a dummy variable, which takes 
one if the loan application is successful. The rationale is that if the linguistic style is able to 
influence lenders’ decision making, this will be manifested by the probability of funding 
success. 
 
The independent variables to proxy psychological distancing are the number of second person 
pronouns (NumYou) and the number of negations (Negations)13. Toma and Hancock (2012) 
                                                          
13 Examples of second person pronouns and negations are as followings: “The purpose of the loan is 
to buy machinery and pay deposit of the business. As long as the business works well, I can have 
approximately RMB 20,000 per month. There is no problem to pay back loan. Hope you trust me.”  “I 
have some spare time after work so I would like to apply for my first loan here to do some small 
business. I have no idea whether it is trustworthy or not trustworthy (NT: in English, we may omit last 
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suggest linguistically, psychological distancing manifest itself by a decrease in first person 
pronouns and an increase in negations. Pronouns can reveal how people are referencing those 
outside of or in the interaction (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010).The use of first-person plural 
pronouns (“we” and “ours”) implies inclusiveness while second and third- person pronouns 
(“you” and “they”) distance them away from the interaction. Moreover, in the Chinese 
linguistics, the use of second person pronouns ”ni” is associated with perceived disrespect 
(Jiang et al., 2013).  As it is less likely to use first and third-plural pronouns when writing to 
an unknown audience (Toma and Hancock, 2012), we follow Toma and Hancock (2012) to 
measure psychological distancing using the number of second person pronouns (NumYou) and 
in light of extant research (Simmons et al, 2005; Revenstorf et al, 1984), we predict the use of 
“you” would lead to unsatisfactory funding outcome.   
Toma and Hancock (2012) also suggest psychological distance increases along with use of 
negations. Xu (2015) invited 113 Chinese college students with average age of 18.8 year old 
to participate in an experiment related to negations communication. The results show that 
senders’ negations communication has a negative effect on receivers’ impression. To be 
specific, when the positive information is sent with negations, receivers tend to response 
negatively. Moreover, using a doctor-patient experiment, Burgers et al (2012) find patients feel 
more negative when positively framed bad news with negations are delivered than with 
affirmations. We therefore predict a negative relationship between negations and funding 
outcome. 
 
The moderator is language intensity. Li and Zhan (2011) suggest number of exclamation marks, 
strong positive emotions and strong negative emotions can be used to identify language 
                                                          
trustworthy but in Chinese, we keep it) so I just try a small amount of money. I am working at 
Changsha and have bought a 150 square feet flat in my hometown.” 
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intensity. We therefore first follow Huang et al. (2020) to calculate the sentiment index of 
borrowers’ description. Then we follow Li and Zhan (2011) to create two dummy variables, 
extremPos and extremNeg. extremPos takes one if the sentiment index is higher than 90% 
percentile, or zero otherwise. extremNeg takes one if the sentiment index is lower than 10% 
percentile, or zero otherwise. Following Li and Zhan (2011) and Han et al (2018), last variable 
to proxy language intensity is the number of exclamation mark (Exclamation).  
 
Control variables include number of words used to describe the project, education, age, 
loan amount, loan duration and monthly income. A longer text is considered to be a signal of 
openness and transparency from the borrowers’ end of the transaction and therefore we expect 
that lenders are willing to fund loans that are well described and explained (Dorfleitner et al, 
2016). In addition, the longer text, the more likely positive words could be included. Yet, if the 
description text is too wordy, the investors may not have enough patience to go through all the 
text. Since they only invest a small amount of money, it is not worth to cost much time 
(Dorfleitner et al, 2016). Taken together, we expect a positive association between the number 
of words and investors’ action. Income indicates income range where n=0(less than 1000RMB), 
1 (between 1000 and 2000RMB), 2(between 2001 and 5000 RMB),3 (between 5001 and 10000 
RMB), 4(between 10001 and 20000 RMB), 5(between 20001 and 50000 RMB), and 6 (over 
50000 RMB); Degree indicates the education level where n=0 (high school or lower), 1(junior 
college), 2(undergraduate), and 3 (master or above); NonOffline is coded one if the listing has 
not been verified through the offline authentication. Credit rating is provided by Renrendai, 






3.5 Research Design and Model Specification 
Our research interest is whether psychological distancing measured by linguistic styles is 
associated with investors’ decision making. Since we cannot observe language styles from the 
borrowers who use offline authentication service and the offline branch staff will upload a 
template to description if they use these service, we need to confine our sample only to the 
listings without offline authentication. Yet, borrowers who do not choose authentication service 
may follow specific demographic pattern so simply regressing this sample is not appropriate. 
It is possibly that factors influencing borrowers’ choice of authentication service could be also 
correlated with lenders’ decision. In this case, the coefficients of linguistic styles would be 
correlated to error term. There is a selection bias if we simply use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
or generalized least squares (GLS) (Wang et al, 2008). 
In order to overcome the selection bias, we adopt Heckman’s (1979) seminal work known as 
two step method. In short, Heckman two step method corrects sample selection by first using 
a probit model to regress the individual characteristics on offline authentication decision. The 
outcome variable is regressed in the second step using least square on the independent variables 
which are our interests and fitted value from the first step (selection equation).  
The identification of Heckman method needs a valid exclusion restriction in the selection 
equation. To do so, we need a variable that is in the selection equation but excluded in second 
stage equation. If we fail to meet exclusion restriction in the selection equation, the estimates 
of second equation are likely to be biased (Angrist & Krueger, 2001; Hamilton & Nickerson, 
2003). In this study, we use Branch. Branch indicates whether the borrower is able to find an 
offline branch to do the physical check. This variable is valid because in the second step, 
Branch is not related to the dependent variable, funding success. Hence, we exclude Branch in 
our main analysis. If there is no local branch, borrowers may have to apply online without 
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authentication. Other variables include Mortgage, car loan, age, income, education and gender. 
We conjecture that whether borrower choosing offline authentication or not is associated with 
their self-confidence. If borrowers have previous loan records (mortgage or car loan), they may 
be willing to do offline authentication because loan history may signal good credit 
trustworthiness. Also, female borrowers are more likely to use offline service because they are 
more conservative compared to male borrowers who are bold and risk taking. We use STATA 
command, Heckprobit, to estimate two steps mentioned.  
 
Prob(NonOffline = 1) = β0 + β1Mortgage +  β2𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 +  β3𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ + β4𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
 β5𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 +  β6𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  β7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + µ                   (1)                                                                                                   
 
Prob(Funded = 1) = β0 + β1𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑠 +  β2𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 +  β3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 +
 β4𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  β5𝐿𝑛 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + β6𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  β7𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + β8𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  + β9𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟  +µ                                                                   
(2)                                                                                                                             
 
Where (2) is the main equation, while (1) is the sample selection equation.  Linguistic styles 
includes NumYou and Negations. 
 
3.6 Empirical Results  
Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics. Panel A is for unsuccessful loans and Panel B displays 
statistics of successful campaign. Compared to successful loans, unsuccessful loans have, on 
average, higher numbers of NumYou (0.02 against 0.00) and Negations (0.360 against 0.140). 
These statistics provide initial support to our hypotheses. Table 10 shows the VIF test results. 
The VIF test is to assess multicollinearity. The maximum VIF is 6.39 and the mean VIF is 2.19. 
Given the threshold of is 10, there is no sign of multicollinearity.  
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A Unsuccessful Loans 
variable N Mean sd min max 
WordCount 22125 58.03 52 4 718 
CreditRating 22125 0.0300 0.260 0 5 
LnAmount 22125 10.88 1 8.010 13.12 
Income 22125 3.060 1.170 0 6 
interest 22125 12.65 0.670 8 13 
months 22125 20.20 6.180 3 36 
age 22125 30.41 6.240 22 56 
marriage 22125 0.620 0.570 0 3 
gender 22125 0.160 0.360 0 1 
NumYou 22125 0.02 0.170 0 5 
Negation 22125 0.360 0.770 0 12 
extrmPos 22125 0.0900 0.280 0 1 
extrmNeg 22125 0.0300 0.180 0 1 
Exclamation 22125 0.210 0.740 0 40 
NonOffline 22125 1 0.0400 0 1 
mortgage 22125 0.120 0.320 0 1 
carloan 22125 0.0700 0.250 0 1 
Branch 22125 0.430 0.500 0 1 
 
Panel B Successful Loans 
variable N Mean sd min max 
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WordCount 8924 117.2 57.84 19 492 
CreditRating 8924 4.440 1.470 0 5 
LnAmount 8924 10.82 0.650 8.010 12.44 
Income 8924 3.610 1.310 0 6 
interest 8924 11.43 0.960 8 13.20 
months 8924 25.26 9.970 3 48 
age 8924 37.22 8.430 20 62 
marriage 8924 0.930 0.510 0 3 
gender 8924 0.260 0.440 0 1 
NumYou 8924 0.00 0.0300 0 1 
Negation 8924 0.140 0.430 0 8 
extrmPos 8924 0.140 0.340 0 1 
extrmNeg 8924 0.280 0.450 0 1 
Exclamation 8924 0.0300 0.290 0 11 
NonOffline 8924 0.280 0.450 0 1 
mortgage 8924 0.350 0.480 0 1 
carloan 8924 0.0900 0.290 0 1 
Branch 8924 0.870 0.330 0 1 
 
Table 10. VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
CreditRating 6.39 0.156447 
interest 5.47 0.182912 
months 4.44 0.225299 
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Lnwordcount 1.94 0.516245 
age 1.55 0.647053 
LnAmount 1.44 0.696090 
Income 1.37 0.732255 
marriage 1.32 0.758908 
extrmNeg 1.27 0.787308 
Negation 1.25 0.800785 
extrmPos 1.15 0.866839 
Exclamation 1.04 0.963718 
gender 1.03 0.973436 
NumYou 1.02 0.976741 






Table 11. Correlation Coefficient  
 
Funded WordCount CreditRating LnAmount Income interest months age marriage gender NumRealYou Negation extremePos extremeNeg Exclamation NonOffline mortgage carloan Branch 
Funded 1             
            WordCount 0.446*** 1 
                 CreditRating 0.925*** 0.481*** 1 
                LnAmount -0.029*** 0.084*** 0.061*** 1 
               Income 0.201*** 0.199*** 0.211*** 0.386*** 1 
              
interest -0.586*** -0.366*** -0.588*** 0.173*** 
-
0.219*** 1 
             
months 0.293*** 0.077*** 0.373*** 0.307*** 
-
0.044*** 0.418*** 1 
            
age 0.406*** 0.241*** 0.431*** 0.217*** 0.253*** 
-
0.230*** 0.188*** 1 
           
marriage 0.248*** 0.132*** 0.263*** 0.161*** 0.175*** 
-
0.117*** 0.149*** 0.474*** 1 
          
gender 0.122*** 0.070*** 0.135*** 0.032*** 0.013** 
-
0.056*** 0.087*** 0.058*** 0.099*** 1 
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0.018*** -0.00700 -0.013** 1 
        










0.020*** 0.141*** 1 
       






0.023*** 0.027*** 0 0.167*** 1 
      
extremeNeg 0.363*** 0.214*** 0.394*** 0.056*** 0.026*** 
-
0.158*** 0.261*** 0.147*** 0.117*** 0.074*** 0.012** 
-
0.026*** -0.111*** 1 
     










0.031*** 0.021*** 0.101*** 0.00900 -0.044*** 1 
    










0.122*** 0.043*** 0.219*** 0.170*** -0.461*** 0.124*** 1 
   
mortgage 0.277*** 0.102*** 0.291*** 0.179*** 0.118*** 
-
0.026*** 0.310*** 0.189*** 0.173*** 0.060*** -0.029*** 
-
0.084*** -0.037*** 0.194*** -0.049*** -0.324*** 1 
  
carloan 0.048*** 0.00400 0.046*** 0.095*** 0.138*** -0.00400 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.089*** 0.00200 -0.00700 
-
0.030*** -0.036*** 0.032*** -0.012** -0.078*** 0.082*** 1 
 
Branch 0.403*** 0.172*** 0.435*** 0.036*** 0.118*** 
-
0.234*** 0.187*** 0.154*** 0.082*** 0.053*** -0.028*** 
-




Table 12 shows the results of first step Heckman selection model, which is a probit regression 
of not doing offline authentication against factors considered to influence whether a borrower 
chooses to engage in offline authentication. The dependent variable, NonOffline, is a binary 
variable indicating whether a borrower engaged in offline authentication. NonOffline takes one 
if the borrowers didn’t choose offline authentication, because in second step, we only focus the 
borrowers without offline authentication. In Table 12 model (1), we do not include the age, 
marriage, income and gender. After adding these in model (2), the R square increases to 0.437 
from 0.334. The increase in R square shows high explanatory power of branch and necessity 
of including this variable. The value of the Chi square change (-3266.0648, p<0.01) at the 
bottom of Table 12 again implies that Model 2 has a better fit. Hence, we use model (2) in the 
main analysis. In line with our prediction, financial accessibility plays a key role in offline 
authentication. The negative and significant coefficient of branch indicates if there is a local 
branch in the city, the borrower is more likely to undergo offline authentication. Being able to 
take mortgage and car loan and receiving higher income are signals of creditworthiness and 
give confidence to borrowers. So the coefficient of mortgage and car loan, and income are 
negative and significant, which implies borrowers with mortgage and car loan, and higher 
income are more likely to use offline services. The significantly negative coefficient of age and 
negative coefficient of gender indicate younger and male borrowers are more risk-taking so 
they are more willing to apply online directly without offline authentication.  
 
Table 12. Selection Equation 
 (1) (2) 
 NonOffline NonOffline 
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mortgage -0.987*** -0.835*** 
 (-43.05) (-34.16) 
carloan -0.262*** -0.294*** 
 (-7.58) (-7.92) 
Branch -2.723*** -2.862*** 
 (-36.66) (-37.70) 
age  -0.0611*** 
  (-39.48) 
marriage  -0.309*** 
  (-14.14) 
Income  0.0206* 
  (2.38) 
gender  -0.360*** 
  (-13.86) 
_cons 3.333*** 5.773*** 
 (44.76) (60.52) 





Log Likelihood (LL) 
 
-10542.435 -8909.4026 
Deviance (-2LL or Chi 
square change vs. Model 1) 
 
 -3266.0648*** 
*** 1% ** 5% * 10%  
Z statistics in parentheses; 
 
The empirical results of main analysis (second step) are shown in Table 13 and Table 14. 
Generally speaking, the use of the Heckman model is suitable because the P-Value of the Wald 
test from Heckprobit is less than 0.10 for all the model specifications. The dependent variable 
is funding success. The Table 13 shows the results of the number of “you” (NumYou) and the 
model 1 shows the coefficient of NumYou is -0.487 and significant at 1%. We then gradually 
add interaction terms of NumYou and language intensity variables to test moderating effects 
of language intensity. The table 13 model 2 shows PosYou, the interaction of extremPos and 
NumYou, is negative and significant (β= -3.664, p<0.01).The interaction term of extremNeg 
and NumYou, NegYou, is not statistically significant (β=0.082, p>0.1), while the interaction 
of Exclamation and NumYou, ExclamYou, is negative and significant (β=-3.801, p<0.01).  
The Table 14 shows the results of Negations. The model 1 shows Negations are negatively 
related to the funding success and it is statistically significant at 1% (β=-0.097, p<0.01). Again, 
we put interactions of language intensity variables and Negations to the model. The three 
interactions of language intensity and Negations, PosNeg, NegNeg and ExclamNeg are not 
significant (β=-0.094, p>0.1; β=0.029, p>0.1; β= 0.018, p>0.1 respectively).  
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Table 13. Main results: the number of you 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Funded Funded Funded Funded 
LnUSTword 0. 712*** 0.706*** 0.727*** 0. 716 *** 
 (0.235) (0.236) (0.237) (0. 235) 
LnUSTword2 -0.078** -0.077** -0.081** -0.079** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
CreditRating 1.064*** 1.069*** 1.066*** 1.064*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
LnAmount -0.754*** -0.754*** -0.754*** -0.755*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Income 0.271*** 0.270*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
interest 0.198*** 0.194*** 0.197*** 0.199*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
months -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
age 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
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marriage 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
gender 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.026 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
NumYou -0.462*** -0.439*** -0.512** -0.415*** 
 (0.165) (0.163) (0.223) (0.157) 
extremPos  -0.073   
  (0.078)   
PosYou  -3.673***   
  (0.245)   
extrmNeg   0.072  
   (0.092)  
NegYou   0.121  
   (0.274)  
Exclamation    -0.018 
    (0.024) 
exclamYou    -3.855*** 
    (0.211) 
cons 1.058 1.097 1.046 1.044 
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 (0.870) (0.873) (0.873) (0.871) 
/athrho 0.098* 0.098* 0.098* 0.098* 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
N 31049 31049 31049 31049 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 14. Main results: the number of negations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Funded Funded Funded Funded 
LnUSTword 0. 658*** 0. 628** 0.689*** 0.677*** 
 (0. 242) (0. 246) (0.248) (0. 243) 
LnUSTword2 -0.067** -0.062* -0.072** -0.069** 
 (0.034) (0. 035) (0.035) (0.034) 
CreditRating 1.064*** 1.071*** 1.066*** 1.064*** 
 (0.051) (0.020) (0.051) (0.051) 
LnAmount -0.752*** -0.751*** -0.751*** -0.753*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Income 0.267*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.267*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
interest 0.203*** 0.198*** 0.202*** 0.202*** 
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 (0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) 
months -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.040*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
age 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
marriage 0.087** 0.085** 0.087** 0.087** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
gender 0.029 0.031 0.030 0.028 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Negation -0.081*** -0.072** -0.089*** -0.088*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) 
extrmPos  -0.037   
  (0.080)   
PosNeg  -0.077   
  (0.088)   
extrmNeg   0.025  
   (0.111)  
NegNeg   0.042  
   (0.060)  
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Exclamation    -0.030 
    (0.030) 
exclamNeg    0.020 
    (0.014) 
cons 1.086 1.174 1.037 1.076 
 (0.870) (0.873) (0.879) (0.872) 
/athrho 0.099* 0.100* 0.100* 0.099* 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
N 31049 31049 31049 31049 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
3.7.1 Contribution   
The intent of this research is to advance of our knowledge of the effect of psychological 
distancing on P2P funding performance. We bridge the P2P lending literature and 
psycholinguistics literature and set out to explain how psychological distancing manifested by 
linguistic styles can influence lenders’ decision on P2P funding campaign. Building upon CLT, 
we find psychological distancing is a key predictor of P2P funding success for entrepreneurs 
after controlling for sample selection bias. Our results are consistent with Parhankangas and 
Renko (2017) which suggests avoiding psychological distancing is important for social 
entrepreneurs in reward-based crowdfunding campaign. We extend the their results to debt-
based crowdfunding. This finding is also consistent with psycholinguistics literature which 
suggests that psychological distancing is associated with negative interpersonal outcome 
(Simmons et al, 2005; Revenstorf et al, 1984). Specifically, the number of “you” and the 
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number of negations used in borrowers’ description are negatively related to the willingness of 
the lender to support the funding campaign. Moreover, drawing on LET and extant literature 
which suggests a moderating role of language intensity (Bowers, 1963; Burgoon et al., 2002), 
we posit the language intensity tends to strengthen the negative relationship between 
psychological distancing and funding success. Our empirical results provide general support 
for the argument.  
Our contributions to the literature are twofold. First, this paper contributes to the role of 
language in crowdfunding (Parhankangas and Renko, 2017; Anglin et al., 2018; Herzenstein 
et al., 2011; Allison et al., 2013; Majumdar and Bose, 2018). This strand of literature tends to 
find how borrowers use language strategically to improve the likelihood of funding success in 
different types of campaign. Studies rely on message forming or signaling theory and 
investigate the narratives that have been written on purpose (Huang et al., 2020; Anglin et al., 
2018; Block et al., 2018). Yet, borrowers may unconsciously write something that influence 
lenders’ decision. Drawing on CLT, we first argue the high psychological distancing produced 
by unconscious use of linguistic style will have reduced affective concern, which has a negative 
influence on P2P funding performance.  
Second, we contribute to LET by exploring the moderating role of language intensity in P2P 
lending. Prior studies find a detrimental role language intensity in internet-mediated 
environments (Han et al., 2018; Li and Zhan, 2011). However, their study does not find support 
LET which posits a moderating role of language intensity interacting with source 
characteristics (Han et al., 2018). We show the moderating effect of language intensity with 
psychological distancing in determining lenders’ perception and find support for LET. In 
addition, existing researches examine psychological distancing and language intensity 
separately. However, language intensity that is closely related to tone of communication cannot 
be separate during the communication. Recipients perceive the quality of messages with both 
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linguistic styles and tone of communication together. Therefore, investigating how linguistic 
styles interact with language intensity is necessary. Our results suggest that language intensity 
negatively strengthen the negative association between the number of second person pronouns 
and funding success but has no significant effect on the relationship between negations and 




Our results also have some practical implication. For borrowers, it is important to avoid 
psychological distancing with lenders through linguistic styles and tone of communication. For 
example, borrowers should reduce the use of second person pronouns and negations. Especially 
in China, the use of second person pronouns, “ni” shows disrespectful. Recipients are confused 
if high frequency use of negations in the communication because it is difficult to process 
negations for human beings.  
This study is not without drawbacks. First, although we construct our variables based on loan 
description, we did not pay attention to the specific content they disclosure. Yet, it is believed 
that investors also will consider the information they mentioned. So researchers are encouraged 
to analyze the specific content when doing further investigation. Second, this research is solely 
based on the data from one Chinese crowdfunding platform, Renrendai. Albeit Renrendai is 
one of the biggest and the most popular platforms in China, it is unique among other platforms 
in many aspects. This may limit the generality of our study. Hence, it is suggested future studies 




Chapter 4 The effect of Peer-to-Peer lending on financial exclusion: Evidence from China 
 
Abstracts 
The association of financial technology (fintech) and financial exclusion has attracted attention 
since rapid growth of fintech innovation. This study investigates the funding probability of the 
financial excluded borrower in a large P2P lending platform. Using loan-level data from a 
lending Chinese P2P company, we find there is a negative indirect effect of financial exclusion 
on funding success through credit score. In a moderated mediation analysis, we also find new 
business model such as offline authentication and education qualification positively moderates 
the linkage between the financial excluded and credit score and therefore negative indirect 
effect of financial exclusion on funding success is overturned when the excluded borrower has 
conducted offline authentication and obtained higher education qualification. Lastly, we 
examine the determinants of offline authentication decision. We find the borrowers in a city 
with better financial infrastructure are more willing to conduct authentication. However, the 
financial excluded borrowers are less likely to conduct offline authentication. 
 
“We envision a financially inclusive world where all people hold the power to improve their 
lives. More than 1.7 billion people around the world are unbanked and can’t access the financial 
services they need. Kiva is an international nonprofit, founded in 2005 in San Francisco, with 
a mission to expand financial access to help underserved communities thrive. We do this by 
crowdfunding loans and unlocking capital for the underserved, improving the quality and cost 
of financial services, and addressing the underlying barriers to financial access around the 
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world. Through Kiva's work, students can pay for tuition, women can start businesses, farmers 
are able to invest in equipment and families can afford needed emergency care.” 
                                                                                                             ——Kivo.org 
4.1 Introduction 
The development of Financial Technologies (“Fintechs) has changed the financial world (Chen 
and Bellavitis.,2020; Palmie.,2020; Panos and Wilson., 2020). It can offer new and fast 
financial services to a larger group of people by integrating finance and technology. The 
Fintechs are expected to replace/complement traditional financial systems and adopt new 
business model benefiting from new technologies and market conditions. For example, with 
smartphone, people can conduct most of personal banking business which can only be done 
face-to-face previously. Moreover, one of the Fintechs, Peer-to-Peer lending (thereafter, P2P 
lending), enables borrowers to get unsecured loans (e.g., loans without collateral) from 
individual lenders in a P2P platform (Lin et al., 2013). The unsecured loans lift the barriers of 
people getting the loan to some extent so researchers consider P2P lending may allay financial 
exclusion (Sparreboom and Duflos, 2012). 
Financial exclusion has been regarded as a multi-dimensional concept that consists of a set of 
obstacles to accessing and using basic financial services (Kempson and Whyley, 1999a,b; 
Devlin., 2005). To alleviate financial exclusion is a critical element for poverty reduction and 
social development. It is expected to result in greater financial stability and economic growth14. 
It is important to distinguish two seemingly similar words, access and use, in the context of 
financial exclusion. Access refers to the supply of financial products while use is determined 
by both supply and demand (World Bank, 2014). This study focuses on examining the credit 
provision perspective of financial exclusion. This is a supply-side/access issue coming from 
financial institutions unwilling to provide credit to certain group of people. Kempson and 
                                                          
14 https://www.adb.org/publications/financial-inclusion-asia-overview 
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Whyley (1999a,b) have identified five dimensions of financial exclusion: (1) access exclusion 
coming from adverse risk assessment or branch closures; (2) condition exclusion that means 
individuals are excluded because financial products are not designed for them; (3) price 
exclusion where individuals are not able to afford financial services; (4) marketing exclusion 
where individuals are excluded by targeting marketing and sales; (5) self-exclusion where 
individuals choose not to use financial products due to preferences, cultural norms, religious 
norms and etc. The first four dimensions of financial exclusion are related to supply-side 
barriers while the last one coming from the demand side. Actually, financial exclusion can be 
assessed in many ways such as money transmission, credit, pensions, insurance cover, financial 
education, debt and etc (McKillop and Wilson., 2007). Ibtissem and Bouri (2013) suggest low 
income households are generally considered that they are financially excluded. In line with 
Ibtissem and Bouri (2013), this study uses low income to proxy the financial exclusion. Due to 
only a few people who are able to access to basic financial services nowadays, alleviating 
financial exclusion is yet an unfinished task. The obstacles that prevent people access to basic 
financial services include physical, bureaucratic, financial and trust barriers (Aggarwal and 
Klapper, 2013). Innovation in fintech opens a potential avenue for addressing the problems. 
For example, In a case study of Autazes, a county located in Amazon region, Diniz et al (2012) 
find information and communication technology-based (ICT) branchless banking enables tens 
of millions of low-income local residents access to financial services; there is no other way to 
access to banking services for most of them. In the descriptive analysis of internet finance 
disparity among Chinese provinces, Hasan et al (2020) suggest in the eastern and the southern 
of China, people have largely adopted Fintechs such as internet and mobile banking and this 
leads to alleviating financial exclusion in these provinces. In addition, Inception of P2P lending 
will make more people get access to credit and have a deeper reach than banks because it can 
connect potential lenders and borrowers directly without financial intermediaries (Sparreboom 
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and Duflos, 2012; Komarova Loureiro and Gonzalez., 2015). Using an US survey data asking 
people how they finance their business, Schweitzer and Barkley (2017) find borrowers who 
have been denied credit by the bank turn to online lenders to provide credit for their business; 
they conclude online lenders can provide credit to the borrowers who are not qualified for bank 
financing. The physical barriers such as no bank branches can be also addressed by P2P 
platforms as the transactions can be completed online. Yet, the some negative effects found in 
fintech lending poses a question on fintech’s prospect for mitigating financial exclusion. Based 
on Prosper’ data15, Freedman and Jin (2011) find P2P lenders are more willing to serve 
consumers who can traditionally obtain funds from banks as the platform tends to exclude more 
and more subprime borrowers. In this case, P2P platform will become an alternative choice of 
privileged borrowers rather than a channel for financially excluded borrowers. Lin and 
Viswanathan (2015) find evidence that P2P lender are more willing to fund local borrowers 
and suggest internet technology is less likely to address home bias, which means borrowers 
from rural and remote area may not benefit from fintech innovation. Fuster et al. (2019) find 
although fintech lenders has increased their market share in mortgage lending from 2010 to 
2016 from 2% to 8%, fintech borrowing is positively associated with bank branch density and 
they don’t target borrowers who are unable to get access to traditional finance. This again 
implies again fintech cannot enable credit to a larger group of people. In addition, regulatory 
and supervisory authority may not be able to response to the new technology timely so fintech 
players could not fit into current regulatory regime and their rights may be compromised. 
Concerns of cyber security are another issue to discourage participation of new technology.  
Research Questions 
Among all the concerns mentioned above, the asymmetric information is the main concern of 
lenders in emerging market to participate in P2P market (Chen et al., 2018). Asymmetric 
                                                          
15 Prosper is a leading P2P company in the US. 
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information leads to capital rationing of the lenders (i.e., each lenders only contribute to small 
amount of funding) and, as a result, restraints the participants’ ability to raise the funds 
(Matson., 1999). If there is no lenders willing to supply credit, no one can benefit from the 
fintech innovation. The P2P platform therefore have created in-house credit rating system to 
tackle asymmetric information in the country without nationwide-recognized credit rating 
system such as China. After submission of documents that the platform asks, the platform will 
assign a credit score to borrowers. The credit system plays an important role in encouraging 
participation. Evidences show that lenders are more willing to bid in higher rating campaign 
and borrowers with higher credit rating are more like to be funded (Chen et al., 2018; Tao et 
al., 2017). However, the financial exclusion is directly related to low income, so the financial 
excluded may not be able to have a high credit score and as a consequence, they are less likely 
to have their loan requests funded. To date, the study to examine the interplay between the 
financial excluded and P2P lending success is scarce and contradictory (Komarova Loureiro 
and Gonzalez., 2015; Lin and Viswanathan, 2015). More importantly, little is known about the 
role of credit score in the linkage between the financial exclusion and P2P funding success. 
This is probably because credit score is not assigned by the platform in developed countries 
(Chen and Han, 2012). The research gap is problematic given the alleviation of asymmetric 
information and funding performance of financial excluded borrowers rely on credit score 
system (Chen and Han, 2012). The credit score may be the key to allay financial exclusion in 
P2P lending market. Therefore, we raise the first research question: Does the credit score play 
a mediating role in the association between the financial excluded and funding success? The 
P2P platform in China offers a great laboratory. The number of P2P borrowers and lenders in 
China have increased significantly in recent years and the credit score are assigned by Chinese 
P2P platforms (Huang et al., 2020). The mediation hypothesis is consistent with data generation 
process given the fact that the borrower submits their application first, then is assigned a credit 
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score and finally is accessed by the lenders. Empirical evidences also find credit rating has a 
direct impact on funding success (Tao et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018). Moreover, low income 
households are financially excluded because of their low credit score assigned by the credit 
bureau (Bridges and Disney, 2004). We therefore conjecture that the financial excluded has an 
influence on funding success mainly through the channel of credit score. In addition, if the 
mediating effect of credit score indeed exists, this implies the P2P platform has an influence 
on both the financial excluded and lenders’ decision making as the credit score is provided by 
the platform. 
To further reassure participants, major P2P platforms have adopt offline authentication to 
mitigate lenders’ concerns about information asymmetry and as a risk reduction tool for 
platforms themselves. Borrowers who have been offline authenticated can positively signal 
their creditworthiness to the investors. Using data from Renrendai, Tao et al (2017) find that 
offline authentication can significantly reduce the problem of asymmetric information. They 
find the listings with offline authentication are more likely to get funded, decrease the interest 
rate and repay the loan on time. In an analysis of Canadian platforms, Cumming et al (2019) 
show platform due diligence such as site visit has a positive impact on funding success, number 
of contributor and amount of capital raised. However, due to the uniqueness of offline 
authentication, many P2P research excludes loans with offline authentication from their data 
sets and claims these are not typical P2P loans (Chen et al, 2019).  Application of such business 
model in the country with severe asymmetric information may promote fintech innovation’s 
potential of addressing the problem of financial exclusion. Moreover, level of education plays 
a key role in financial exclusion (McKillop and Wilson, 2007; Kobu, 2015; Solo, 2008; 
Amaeshi, 2006).  Amaeshi (2006) attributes financial exclusion in Nigeria to illiteracy. 
Providing a higher education qualification also signals creditworthiness of the borrowers since 
they are expected to have a higher income (Xu et al., 2018). Therefore, the financial excluded 
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with a higher educational attainment may enable lenders to trust them due to their ability to 
make money and repay the loan (Swaidan et al., 2003). As the one of main issues that prevent 
lenders’ participation is asymmetric information, we expect the funding performance of the 
financial excluded will be better after effective signals (e.g. offline authentication and 
education qualification) have been provided. So far, P2P platforms’ offline check model, 
educational attainment and their impact on the association between P2P lending success and 
financial exclusion has not been sufficiently investigated. Although studies have showed 
offline authentication and educational attainment play a positive role in funding success for 
borrowers from a wide spectrum of the population (Li and Hu., 2019; Tao et al., 2017), whether 
the conclusion still holds for the financial excluded remains unknown. Without such 
information, related parties such as P2P platforms and the government cannot act accordingly 
to reduce financial exclusion. Given the fact that the borrower will be assigned credit score 
after offline authentication and submission of education information, to investigate how offline 
authentication and education background moderate the financial excluded and credit score and 
consequently influence funding performance is more appropriate. This is so called moderated 
mediating effect of offline authentication and education attainment. Hence, the second research 
question is: Does offline authentication and education attainment positively moderate the 
financial excluded and credit score and improve the probability of funding success? Lastly, the 
empirical evidences mentioned above suggest a positive role of offline authentication on 
funding performance. We will try to answer are the financial excluded more likely or less likely 
to conduct offline authentication.  
Using a large Chinese P2P platform data, we find credit score negatively mediates the financial 
excluded and funding success. We further show that the negative effect of the financial 
excluded on funding success is mainly through the channel of credit score which accounts for 
about 98% of total negative effect. This study contributes to previous P2P and financial 
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exclusion literature by documenting the mediation effect of credit score plays an important role 
in the relation between the financial excluded and funding performance. The moderated 
mediation analyses show that both educational attainment and offline authentication have a 
positive influence on the association between the financial excluded and funding success 
through credit score. The negative effect is overturned when the financial excluded have 
obtained a higher education qualification or conducted offline authentication. The finding 
suggests that P2P lending doesn’t necessarily reduce financial exclusion but it can achieve the 
goal though education or by some new business model innovations such as offline 
authentication.   
 
 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Many financial services such as supply of short term credit are regarded as essential services16. 
Rejection from such activities can be considered as financial exclusion17 (Howell and Wilson, 
2005). Ozili (2020) suggests some special agents such as micro-finance institutions (MFIs) and 
post offices can make excluded people access to financial services better than other traditional 
financial institutions do. For example, postal operator has a unique network of counters so they 
are able to deliver their financial services to the excluded people facing physical barriers, 
especially in rural areas of developing countries (D'alcantara and Gautier, 2013). Ozili (2020) 
suggests to combat financial exclusion, ideally, the special agent should: 1) have specialities in 
this area, 2) understand the characteristics of the excluded, 3) address current issues for 
improvement through innovation and 4) bring the excluded into the formal financial system so 
they can have access to the formal financial services and product. The P2P company has 
                                                          
16 See eg Office of Fair Trading (UK), Vulnerable Consumers and Financial Services: the Report of the Director-General’s 
Inquiry OFT255 (1999) 19. 
17 As this study mainly talks about credit provision perspective of financial exclusion, the following hypotheses are all 
related to loan application of the financial excluded. 
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specialities in helping borrowers to match lenders (Yan et al., 2018; Berger and Gleisner., 
2009). The borrowers they deal with are normally rejected credit by formal financial 
institutions (Hou et al., 2019). The company knows the borrowers very well as they have a 
large amount of borrowers’ information and try to match the lenders through self-innovative 
design (Mi and Zhu, 2017; Tao et al, 2017). These make P2P company an another suited special 
agent for alleviating financial exclusion.  
The poor and other disadvantaged groups such as low income households are most likely to be 
excluded. Based on the agency theory, the exclusion of disadvantaged people from traditional 
financial institution is attributed to the high level of information asymmetry that will cause the 
additional cost to issues of screening, monitoring and enforcement (Ibtissem and Bouri, 2013). 
Taking loan application for example, consumers’ capability to obtain credit is according to the 
resources at their command while the low income borrowers are short of resources, thereby 
lacking of credit qualification (Zhu and Meeks, 1994). Similar to Zhu and Meeks (1994), 
Barakova et al (2013) suggest high income Households are able to secure mortgage financing 
but low income people without stable employment and collateral find difficult to obtain loans. 
Financial vulnerability and exclusion are highly associated with low income (OFT 1999). In a 
theoretical analysis of Chinese famer data, Tan (2014) estimates about 80% of low and medium 
income famers are not able to have adequate credit because providing small loans to famers is 
not profitable for banks. Given the discussion above and the P2P lending market we focus on, 
we use low income borrowers to proxy the financial excluded. 
Moreover, the credit score system may make the low income households excluded even further. 
The Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) in the US created a formula to calculate individual credit 
score that has been used by major credit reporting agencies. Yet, the algorithm is still a secret, 
although people believe it is directly related to the income (Arya et al., 2013). In the UK, due 
to adverse scoring from credit bureaux, low-income households are financially excluded from 
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the prime credit outlets (Bridges and Disney, 2004). The low-income borrower in general is 
more likely to be given a low credit score as the risks caused by asymmetric information (e.g., 
select a less creditworthy borrower from high creditworthy borrowers) are high. However, 
building a credible credit scoring system requires huge input at beginning. Not every company 
can afford the cost. In the context of Chinese P2P lending market, there is no nationwide credit 
rating system for individuals so Chinese P2P firms use their in-house credit score to classify 
high or low risk borrowers. It is common that a borrower obtains different credit score in 
different P2P platform (Zhao et al., 2016). Their credit system is opaque. Some borrowers who 
upload many optional certificates still get a lower rating while some borrowers only submit 
compulsory documents but get the highest rating (Zhao et al., 2016). Yet, recent developments 
on big data and credit scoring may help platforms build a self-learning system that is producing 
more reliable results as time goes on when big data on borrowers helps improve the system 
(e.g., See ONAY and ÖZTÜRK(2018) for a review). Hence, most of lenders rely on the credit 
rating to make decisions as the most efficient way for lenders to make decisions is to look credit 
rating, which lowers their screening and transaction cost. Moreover, P2P lenders usually need 
to make quick decisions (Liao et al., 2019). The only way to achieve that is again to look at 
credit rating that offers the most informative signal. Low credit rating given to the financial 
excluded borrowers fails to signal their creditworthiness and are therefore less likely to succeed 
in funding campaign. This is because P2P lenders might think high information asymmetry is 
associated with the financial excluded. We argue that the adverse scoring to the financial 
excluded reduces the probability of financially excluded borrowers being funded. Against this 
background, we hypothesize: 
 





Face to face interaction with loan officer.  
To overcome the difficulty of verifying documents and alleviate asymmetric information, 
offline authentication mechanism has been created and applied by some Chinese P2P platforms. 
Offline authentication includes physical site visits to verify borrowers’ income statement, 
working place and other key documents. The offline investigation mitigates asymmetric 
information and assure lenders by auditing the documents borrowers provide as fabricating 
documents are common online (Toma and Hancock, 2012). Offline loan officers will have a 
face-to-face interaction with the borrower and they may reject borrowers’ loan application if 
they find borrowers were faking the documents or unqualified. In an analysis of offline 
authentication loans in a Chinese P2P lending platform, Tao et al. (2017) show borrows who 
have conducted offline authentication will be awarded higher credit score and find the effect 
of gender, education and marital status on funding success is statistically insignificant, 
implying offline authentication is able to reduce taste-based discrimination18. Besides, the 
additional offline process provides a good opportunity to trustworthy first-time borrowers. 
Fuster et al. (2019) suggest first-time mortgage borrowers prefer to have a face-to-face 
communication with loan officers rather than directly applying online as they are less familiar 
with the process involved. After talking with local loan officers, the loan officers not only will 
instruct borrowers with application process, but warn them the consequences of not paying the 
loan back as well. For example, in the case of default, the platform may first call the borrower 
and then a collection agent will step in (Tao et al., 2017). So, in order to avoid such situation, 
the borrower will try their best to repay the loan. Through face-to-face interaction with the 
                                                          
18  Becker (1957) introduced taste-based discrimination in which a principal simply has a preference for working with one 
type over the other.  
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borrowers, loan officers can also verify soft information such as good characters, which makes 
higher possibility of repayment.  
The financial excluded might benefit from additional offline authentication as well. As 
mentioned above, low funding success rate of the financial excluded is due to high information 
asymmetry so lenders are not willing to provide credit. The offline authentication mitigates 
asymmetric information significantly. Therefore, the financial excluded with offline 
authentication can be given a higher credit score, thereby increasing the likelihood of funding 
success. If the financial excluded has not conducted offline authentication, they might still be 
given a low credit score and have less chance to succeed in funding campaign. Taken together, 
the offline authentication moderates the financial excluded and credit score such that this 
relationship is positive when the financial excluded has conducted offline authentication but 
negative when they has not. In the end, the high (low) credit score will lead to high (low) 
funding success rate. Against this background, we therefore hypothesize: 
H2: offline authentication attenuates the mediated effect of credit score in the relationship 
between the financial excluded and funding success 
 
Uploading education information is an alternative way for P2P borrowers to mitigate 
information asymmetric. The highly educated borrowers are expected to have stable 
employment and higher income and they are perceived less risky borrowers (Xu et al., 2018). 
Therefore, the education attainment can serve as an effective signal to select a more 
creditworthy borrower. More importantly, it is costly and difficult to manipulate (Xu et al., 
2018). The evidences from P2P lending market in China generally support this view. Using 
data from Renrendai, Chen and Ning (2013) and Xu et al (2018) document that borrowers who 
have obtained a higher education degree have higher likelihood to have their loan request 
funded. Huang et al (2020) uncover borrowers with higher education qualification are 
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associated with lower likelihood of default, fewer overdue payments and smaller overdue 
amount based on data from Xinxindai. Moreover, Li and Hu (2019) suggest not only levels of 
education but the institutions matter in China as well. Based on data from Renrendai, they find 
borrowers who have degree from top ranking universities are less likely to default and their 
results are robust using instrumental variable method.  
In addition, educated people are more like to make prudent financial decisions (Fernandes et 
al., 2014). If the interest rate is too high, educated borrowers are less likely to take loan offered 
by these predatory lenders (Xu et al., 2018). Using a meta analysis, Fernandes et al (2014) find 
financial education leads to positive savings. In contrast to the prudent financial decision, the 
ill-advised financial decision by borrowers are the one of the antecedents of delinquency of 
mortgage loans and the effect is pronounced among less creditworthy borrowers (Agarwal et 
al., 2010). More than 140 studies have indicated that education is associated with better 
financial outcomes (Miller et al., 2014). For example, Cole et al (2016) suggest High school 
mathematics training is beneficial to students, which enables greater levels of financial 
participation, more investment income and better debt management. For the financially 
disadvantaged cohort, debt management skills from the education alleviates a range of adverse 
debt behaviors (French and McKillop, 2016). These skills eventually become a personal 
finance-specific form of human capital (Huston, 2015). 
Given the benefit from the better education for financially disadvantaged borrowers mentioned 
above, we predict education qualification plays a vital role in the association between the 
financial excluded and credit score. As the financial excluded with higher education 
qualification are prudent, they must be ready to commit further financial responsibility and 
know how to manage their debt before the loan application. The platform therefore will value 
educated borrowers by awarding them a higher credit score. Taken together, the educational 





positive when the financial excluded has higher education qualification but negative when they 
has not. The higher score then translates to higher likelihood of funding success. Against this 
background, we therefore hypothesize: 
H3: Educational attainment attenuates the mediated effect of credit score in the relationship 
between the financial excluded and funding success. 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework 
 
 
                         
                          
                         





4.3 Research Setting 
In 2013, the Chinese government announced the “inclusive finance” development strategy, 
which is to make financial services accessible to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and 
rural population that have traditionally been denied credit by banks. According to the 
government white paper, the development strategy encourages financial innovations to produce 
financial products. The ultimate goal is to build a well-established financial system that can 
meet the needs of a larger group of people. Now the financial system is regarded as the privilege 
of the State-Owned Enterprises (Fungacova and Weill, 2014). Fintech innovation in P2P credit 
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H1: The credit score mediates the relationship between the financial excluded and funding success. 
 
H2: offline authentication attenuates the mediated effect of credit score in the relationship 
between the financial excluded and funding success. 
 
H3: Educational attainment attenuates the mediated effect of credit score in the relationship between 
the financial excluded and funding success. 
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market may be able to response the call for “inclusive finance” in China by offering great 
opportunities to those who are financially excluded as the market is consist of a larger number 
of credit providers and excluded borrowers who can participate freely in this market. Policy 
makers give priority to financial exclusion as greater access to financial services is beneficial 
to economic activities and population’s welfare. However, financial accessibility remains an 
unresolved issue in China (Chen and Jin, 2017). In developed economies, people obtain credit 
according to their personal credit risk and readily available information from commercial banks 
or government lending agencies (Chai et al., 2019). Yet, in developing economies borrowers’ 
information is limited and accessing borrowers’ creditworthiness is difficult (Grant, 2007). 
Credit information such as credit scores is also not sufficient in China. Only 350 million 
citizens have credit histories, less than one-third of the adult population (Economist, 2016). In 
the US, the credit scores have awarded to 89% of adults (Economist, 2016). Without such 
information, individuals find difficult to get access to credit. Moreover, with the reform of 
state-owned banks and rural credit cooperatives in China, tens of thousands of branches and 
entities closed, which leads to more difficulties in lending and borrowing (Sparreboom and 
Duflos., 2012). Normally to obtain credit from formal institutions, collateral assets and steady 
employment are required. Yet, the conditions are difficult to meet. This is especially true for 
those people with low pay job and low levels of education (Beck et al, 2006). Those also are 
the people who need credit most. Financial institutions are yet not willing to provide loans to 
low income people even though they have met those criteria because the loan they required is 
often too small to be profitable (Johnston and Morduch, 2008). Fungacova and Weill (2014) 
suggest individuals in China find difficult to get access to formal credit as formal financial 
institutions target state-owned enterprises. There is therefore a credit gap for disadvantaged 
borrowers especially for very small loans (Mills and McCarthy, 2016) As a result, these 
difficulties make the vulnerable such as rural and low-income households financially excluded. 
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The inception of P2P lending tries to fills the funding gap by offering an alternative access to 
financial resources. First, most of P2P lending platforms do not require collaterals and the 
lender cannot ask for collaterals. A number of borrowers without collateral benefit from the 
natural of uncollateralized lending. Second, ideally, P2P transactions are completed online. 
Borrowers submit their documentations to the website and lenders will review and evaluate the 
information by themselves to make the decision. The pure online process is not only beneficial 
to the borrowers from rural areas but to the lenders who want to invest remotely.   
 
 
4.4 Empirical design 
In this section, we first test the mediating effect of credit score on the association between 
financial exclusion and funding success in the presence of unique offline authentication 
business model. Following regressions are applied to test our proposed hypotheses. 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = α0 + α 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  Ψ3𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                   (1)     
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 1) = β0 + β1 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 +  𝛤4𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 + Φ2𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 +
µ𝑖(2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
Where 𝑖 indicates 𝑖th listings. The data is from Renrendai, one of the biggest P2P platforms in 
China, between 1 Jan 2015 and 31 Dec 2015. There 400895 listings over our sample period.  
After deleting missing values, we, finally, get in total 264367 listings. Among them, 113381 
listings are fully funded. Each listing has a set of information available to potential investors 
when they made their investment decisions. These information include (1) the loan 
characteristics such as interest rate, credit score, loan amount, loan duration, and loan 
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description, (2) borrower’s information such as gender, age, education qualification, marital 
status, personal income and borrowing history and so on. 
The dependent variable, Funded, in Eq(2) is a dummy variable, which takes 1 if the listing is 
funded successfully and 0 otherwise. 
The key independent variable is Exclusion which takes 1 if the borrower claims their income 
is below 5000RMB and didn’t get mortgage or car loans before. The low-income households 
have long been considered financial exclusion (Ibtissem and Bouri, 2013). The average income 
of our sample is around 5500RMB so we set our threshold below the average. If the borrower 
has obtained the mortgage or car loan before, they therefore are able to get access to financial 
services and are not excluded. Hence, only the borrowers who have a low income and don’t 
have mortgage or car loan are regarded as financial exclusion in this study.  
The mediator, credit score, is a continuous variable, which ranges from -39 to 223. After 
borrowers upload their information to Renrendai, Renrendai will award them a credit score 
based on borrowers’ creditworthiness. To make credit score understandable to all the investors, 
Renrendai created their own credit rating system. Each credit score has a corresponding credit 
rating. Their one-to-one relation is as follows: AA: above 210; A: 180-209; B: 150-179; C:130-
149; D: 110-129; E: 100-109; HR: below 99. We choose credit score not credit rating because 
we would like to disentangle how the platform not investors treats financially excluded 
borrowers and the platform uses credit score to determine their creditworthiness. Moreover, 
credit score is more specific and detailed than credit rating which enables us to capture a small 
variation in the borrower’s creditworthiness.   
Offline and education are moderators. Offline takes 1 if the borrow has conducted offline 
authentication and 0 otherwise. Education, a categorical variable indicating the education level 
from 0 (high school or lower) to 3 (master or above).We then include two interaction terms 
offexclu, product of offline and exclusion, and eduexclu, product of education and exclusion to 
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Eq(1) separately. We would like to test the extent to which offline authentication and borrowers’ 
education qualification can increase/reduce the credit score of financially excluded borrowers, 
and as a result, increase/reduce funding probability.  
We follow the P2P literature to control for a number of loan and borrow level variables that 
have an influence on funding success (Liu et al, 2015; Lin et al, 2013; Freedman and Jin, 2017; 
Dorfleitner et al, 2016; Li and Hu, 2019; Ding et al, 2018). Loan_info is a set of loan level 
control variables it includes (1) Interest, the interest rate of the listing ranging from 7% to 
13.2%; (2) Months, The number of months the borrowers would like to pay back the loan 
ranging from 3 to 48 months; (3) Lnamount, the natural logarithm of the loan amount requested 
by borrowers and (4) Wordcount, the number of words written by the borrower in description. 
Borrower_info is a set of borrower level control variables. Borrower_info includes (1) 
Application, a dummy variable which takes 1 if the borrower has applied loan in the platform 
before and 0 otherwise; (2) Entrepren a dummy variable which takes 1 if the loan is used to 
serve business activity and 0 otherwise; (3) Age, the borrower’s age in years; (4) Male, a 
dummy variable which takes 1 if it is male borrower or 0 otherwise; (5) Married, a dummy 
variable which takes 1 if the borrower is married and 0 otherwise.  
This study adopts structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the mediation effect of credit 
score in the relationship between the financial excluded and funding success. There are many 
studies that recommend SEM approach to test mediation effect (Iacobucci et al., 2007; Zhao et 
al., 2010; Cho and Pucik., 2005). This method also enables us to check the direct negative 
effect of vulnerable borrowers on P2P funding success (Komarova Loureiro and Gonzalez., 
2015). Using SEM instead of three separate regressions proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) 
can better control for measurement errors which might result in under- or over-estimation of 
mediation effects (Shaver, 2005). However, the nature of our dependent variable (funded is a 
dummy variable) makes a linear SEM ill-suited. Applying a linear model with dummy 
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dependent variable will lead to biased results. Hence, we use Generalized SEM (GSEM) model 
that allows binary outcome to fit our proposed regressions (Kaplan and Vakili., 2014). We 
apply linear regression to first part of analysis (determinants of credit score) and logit 
regression with a dummy dependent variable to second part (determinants of funding success). 
Bootstrapping is used to estimate standard error and confidence intervals for the indirect effects.  
4.5 Results  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used. To test H1, We follow the 
mediation testing procedure introduced by Zhao et al (2010). They suggest to test the indirect 
effect α * β (the coefficient of Exclusion in Eq(1) multiplies the coefficient of credit score in 
Eq(2) in our case) using a Bootstrap method. The result is shown in Table 2 Panel B. With a 
1000 repetitions Bootstrap method, coefficient of Exclusion on Funding success through credit 
score is -0.0053 and it is significant at 1% level (P<0.001). The results support the mediating 
role of credit score between financial exclusion and funding success so H1 is supported.  
 
Table 165 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean S.D Min Max 
CreditScore 264367 84.78 80.03 -39 223 
Exclusion 264367 0.280 0.450 0 1 
Offline 264367 0.400 0.490 0 1 
Education 264367 0.950 0.770 0 3 
Age 264367 33.20 7.940 20 63 
Male 264367 0.800 0.400 0 1 
Married 264367 0.590 0.490 0 1 
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application 264367 0.230 0.420 0 1 
Entrepren 264367 0.100 0.300 0 1 
funded 264367 0.430 0.490 0 1 
interestrate 264367 0.120 0.010 0.070 0.130 
months 264367 22.27 10.21 3 48 
Lnamount 264367 10.65 0.980 6.910 13.12 






Table 176. Correlation Coefficient 
 
CreditScore exclusion offline education income age male married application funded interestrate months Lnamount wordcount 
CreditScore 1             
       exclusion -0.222*** 1 
            offline 0.965*** -0.214*** 1 
           education 0.114*** -0.082*** 0.083*** 1 
          income 0.173*** -0.627*** 0.165*** 0.052*** 1 
         age 0.401*** -0.194*** 0.404*** 0.013*** 0.217*** 1 
        male -0.178*** 0.017*** -0.184*** -0.034*** -0.017*** -0.084*** 1 
       married 0.230*** -0.171*** 0.227*** -0.033*** 0.162*** 0.347*** -0.047*** 1 
      application -0.380*** 0.096*** -0.444*** -0.026*** -0.069*** -0.200*** 0.105*** -0.100*** 1 
     funded 0.951*** -0.211*** 0.928*** 0.105*** 0.164*** 0.389*** -0.171*** 0.223*** -0.421*** 1 
    
interestrate -0.357*** 0.032*** -0.355*** -0.025*** -0.148*** -0.124*** 0.029*** -0.065*** 0.148*** 
-
0.361*** 1 
   months 0.599*** -0.170*** 0.623*** 0.107*** 0.011*** 0.278*** -0.155*** 0.159*** -0.284*** 0.564*** 0.363*** 1 
  Lnamount 0.308*** -0.373*** 0.323*** 0.143*** 0.393*** 0.305*** -0.119*** 0.209*** -0.175*** 0.255*** 0.188*** 0.495*** 1 





Table 187. Mediation Testing 
Panel A Structural Equation Modeling  
DV Funded VIF CreditScore  VIF 
exclusion -0.684*** 1.21 -2.098*** 1.08 
 (-22.71)  (-22.13)  
offline 0.633*** 19.53 160.1*** 1.52 
 (6.46)  (1488.44)  
education 0.113*** 1.06 3.444*** 1.02 
 (6.81)  (58.89)  
age 0.0403*** 1.35 0.115*** 1.31 
 (17.52)  (22.93)  
male -0.0636 1.04 -0.214* 1.04 
 (-1.71)  (-2.41)  
married 0.141*** 1.17 1.455*** 1.16 
 (4.82)  (16.39)  
application -1.310*** 1.31 11.51*** 1.25 
 (-40.94)  (80.60)  
Entrepreneurship 0.288*** 1.04 0.233 1.01 
 (6.50)  (1.57)  
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interestrate -13.60*** 3.23   
 (-5.06)    
months 0.0308***  4.92   
 (8.20)    
Lnamount -1.103*** 1.61   
 (-70.35)   
CreditScore 0.0554*** 15.52   
 (105.06)   
constant 6.112*** Mean VIF 
4.20 
11.08*** Mean VIF 1.17 
 (20.47)  (56.82)  
N 264367  264367  
Panel B Mediation Testing with Bootstrapping  (1000 repetitions) 
Mediator Coefficient (a x b)    
CreditScore -0.00533***    
   (-3.19)  
  Panel C Indirect, Direct and Total Effects  
 log odds ratio percentage 
indirect -0.995 0.976 
direct -0.024 0.024 
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total -1.019 1 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001; Z statistics are in parentheses 
 
Although the mediation effect indeed exists, if the indirect effect of exclusion relative to total 
effect is too small, to investigate indirect effect is therefore unnecessary. To explore the indirect 
and total effect, we follow methods suggested by Erikson et al (2005), Buis (2010) and Berry 
Jaeker et al (2020) to calculate the proportion of indirect effect in a logit outcome equation 
(Stata command: ldecomp). The results are shown Table 2 Panel C. The first column is log 
odds ratio and the second shows the percentage. The indirect effect is 97.6% of the total effect.  
 
To test H2 and H3, we follow Preacher et al (2007)’s method to test a moderated mediation. 
When the offline authentication moderates the association between financial exclusion and 
credit score, with a 1000 repetitions Bootstrap method, the coefficient of conditional indirect 
effect of financial exclusion on funding success is from -0.0609 (without offline authentication, 
P<0.000) to 0.0078 (with offline authentication, P<0.011). This means offline authentication 
model can offset the negative impact of financial exclusion on funding success so H2 is 
supported.  
We then test moderated mediation effect of education qualification and the results are presented 
in Table 3. With a 1000 repetitions Bootstrap method, the negative coefficient of conditional 
indirect effect of financial exclusion on funding success is gradually decreasing along with an 
increase in education qualification. When the borrowers hold a high school or lower certificate 
(education = 0), junior college certificate (education= 1) and bachelor degree (education= 2), 
the coefficients are -0.0642 (P<0.000), -0.0387 (P<0.000) and -0.0131 (P<0.012) respectively. 
The coefficient is 0.0123 but it is not statistically significant (P< 0.128), if the borrowers’ have 
a master or doctorate degree. In sum, the negative effect of financial exclusion on funding 
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success will attenuate when the borrowers hold a higher education qualification so H3 is 
supported 
Table 198. Moderated Mediation with Bootstrapping (1000 repetitions) 
Moderator Level Coefficients SE   Z P 
offline 0 -0.0609 .0037308   -16.33 0.000 
 1  0.0078 .0030863   2.54 0.011 
        
Education 0 -0.0642 .0037004   -17.37 0.000 
 1 -0.0387 .0031305   -12.37 0.000 
 2 -0.0131 .005219   -2.52 0.012 
 3  0.0123 .0081245   1.52 0.128 
 
4.6 Robustness and Further analysis  
We use the number of bids as alternative dependent variable to check the robustness of our 
results. As the number of bids is a continuous variable, we can use SEM for testing (Stata 
command: sem). The results are shown in Table 4. 
Table 19. Robustness Check 
Panel A Structural Equation Modeling  
DV Funded CreditScore  
 
 
exclusion -2.052*** -2.098*** 
 (-9.36) (-22.93) 
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offline 8.277*** 160.1*** 
 (10.18) (1599.83) 
education 1.397*** 3.444*** 
 (11.64) (66.48) 
age 0.157*** 0.115*** 
 (11.91) (20.00) 
male -3.004*** -0.214* 
 (-13.17) (-2.14) 
married -0.717*** 1.455*** 
 (-3.62) (16.70) 
application -0.861*** 11.51*** 
 (-3.53) (109.57) 
Entrepreneurship -0.388 0.233 
 (-1.25) (1.72) 
interestrate -2336.1***  
 (-141.90)  
months 2.278***  
 (116.47)  
Lnamount 6.652***  
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 (56.82)  
wordcount -0.0860***  
 (-23.99)  
CreditScore 0.0623***  
 (14.06)  
Constant 179.2*** 11.08*** 
 (84.96) (51.39) 
N 264367 264367 
   
Panel B Mediation Testing with Bootstrapping (1000 repetitions) 
Mediator Coefficient (a x b)    
CreditScore -0.1308***    
   (-11.99)  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001; Z statistics are in parentheses 
 
Offline authentication is a new initiative service provided by the platform to alleviate severe 
asymmetric information in China. Although it has been criticized that authenticated loans are 
not P2P loans, it is still welcomed by investors and investors are more willing to make a 
contribution to such loans. From excluded borrowers’ perspective, we show that offline 
authentication positively moderates the linkage between financial exclusion and credit score 
and therefore increase the funding probability. Given the positive effect of offline 
 115 
authentication on funding outcome, it is necessary to disentangle the factors that influence 
borrowers’ decision to conduct offline authentication. The following model is used. 
 Prob(𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖 = 1) = β0 + β1𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖 + β2𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛤2𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖          
Table 5 shows the results of Eq (3). Model (1) and (2) are the probit and logit estimation 
respectively. The coefficient of branch is 1.755 and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficient of logit model is 3.183 and it is again statistically significant at the 1% level. If 
there is a local branch in borrowers’ city, they are more likely to conduct offline authentication.. 
The result implies cities with better financial infrastructure can give P2P borrowers a better 
opportunity to obtain credit. The coefficients of Exclusion are -0.310 and -0.497 in probit and 
logit model respectively. Both are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the financial 
excluded borrowers are less likely to conduct offline authentication. The reason probably is the 
borrowers who are financially excluded are reluctant to have face-to-face interaction with other 
people, which is consistent with the finding that financial exclusion may lead to social 
exclusion (Wilson, 2012). Psychological barriers and the feelings among the poor that they are 
not qualified to financial services might result in financial exclusion (Solo, 2008). Entrepren 
and Application are both negative and significant at the 1% level in both estimation. The 
borrowers who use their loan to fund their business or have applied the P2P loan before are 
less likely to undergo offline check than other borrowers. Other control variables such as 
education, age, and married have a positive impact on borrowers’ offline authentication choice. 
These imply the borrowers who have better education qualification, older age and been married 
are more willing to undergo offline check before listing online. Compared to female borrower, 
male seems more risk taking so they are more likely to take a chance and directly apply online.  
High income borrowers seem to be confident with their qualification and are more willing to 
pure online application.                      
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Table 200. Determinants of borrowers’ willingness to offline authentication 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Offline Offline 
Lnamount 0.311*** 0.567*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
exclusion -0.310*** -0.497*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) 
branch 1.755*** 3.183*** 
 (0.012) (0.023) 
education 0.057*** 0.093*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) 
income -0.067*** -0.111*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
age 0.055*** 0.097*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
male -0.423*** -0.724*** 
 (0.008) (0.014) 
married 0.311*** 0.521*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) 
application -2.752*** -5.651*** 
 (0.034) (0.075) 
Entrepreneurship -0.514*** -0.928*** 
 (0.012) (0.021) 
_cons -6.225*** -11.299*** 
 (0.054) (0.098) 
N 264367 264367 
pseudo R-sq 0.460 0.464 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001; Robust Standard error are in parentheses 
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4.6 Discussion 
4.6.1 theoretical contribution 
Although researchers are interested in the association between fintech and financial exclusion, 
the association remains unclear. This study tries to answer this question by investigating the 
funding performance of the financial excluded borrowers in a large P2P lending platform.  
Using loan-level data, we find credit score negatively mediates the financial excluded and 
funding success. We also find offline authentication and borrowers’ education background 
positively moderate the linkage between the financial excluded and credit score. Finally, we 
document the financial excluded are less likely to conduct offline authentication even though 
offline authentication give them a better opportunity to obtain the loan.  
We contribute to extant literature in following aspects. First, current P2P studies focus on direct 
effect on funding outcomes but ignore the indirect effect and the underlying channel (Freedman 
and Jin, 2017; Dorfleitner et al, 2016; Herzenstein et al, 2011; Michels, 2012). The reason is 
probably because in the US or other major P2P market, the P2P platform plays a little or no 
role in the investors’ decision making process. However, in China, due to lack of nationwide-
recognized credit rating system, investors rely heavily on the credit score provided by the P2P 
platform. Moreover, the funding decision is made very quickly. 25% of campaigns are fully 
funded within 42 seconds and 75% of them get funded in less than 180 seconds (Liao et al., 
2019). If investors take a longer time to make the decision, investment opportunity is gone. 
Due to time constraint, investors tend to only attend a few salient information. Credit rating 
which is given by the platform therefore plays a vital role in the relationship between funding 
success and the financial excluded. We find credit score in fact mediates the association 
between the financial excluded and funding campaign outcome. Given the important role of 
P2P lending in financial exclusion and inconclusive findings offered by existing literature 
(Komarova Loureiro and Gonzalez., 2015; Lin and Viswanathan, 2015), we contribute to the 
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P2P literature by providing evidence that there is a negative mediation effect of credit score for 
the financial excluded on funding success. 
Second, we contribute financial exclusion literature. The discussion about alleviating financial 
exclusion has a long history. Whether Fintech is able to combat financial exclusion remains 
unclear. We investigate the extent to which the financial excluded can benefit from one of the 
important fintechs, P2P lending. We find although the financial excluded borrowers are less 
likely to be funded, offline authentication, a new business model invented by Chinese P2P 
firms, and their education qualification can positively moderate the linkage between the 
financial excluded and credit score and therefore increase probability of being funded. Our 
results also suggest although offline authentication can provide additional benefit to the 
excluded borrowers, they remain reluctant to conduct authentication. The reason probably is 
the borrowers who are financially excluded are reluctant to have face-to-face interaction with 
other people, which is consistent with the finding that financial exclusion may lead to social 
exclusion (Wilson, 2012). Lastly, the financial infrastructure such as local branch plays a 
positive role in encouraging the borrowers to do the offline authentication. The uneven 
distribution of financial infrastructure makes the financial exclusion even worse in the areas 
without financial infrastructure. 
 
4.6.2 Implications 
The study 3 offers several practical implications. The study suggests that the indirect effect of 
the financial excluded through credit score plays a major role in funding performance instead 
of direct effect. It is therefore possible to allay financial exclusion by improving the credit score 
system. For example, in recent years, big data offers opportunity to incorporate digital 
footprints such as the website that the borrowers visited and the mobile they used (i.e. IOS or 
Android) in assessing borrowers’ creditworthiness. Such big data provides more 
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comprehensive and accurate credit information than traditional data (Berg et al., 2020). It also 
may give the financial excluded a better chance when the platforms use it to determine their 
credit scores. Furthermore, the results from study 3 show offline authentication and human 
capital such as education attainment can improve the likelihood of funding success 
significantly and the establishment of offline branch can lead to higher probability of offline 
authentication. The offline branch is hence considered an important financial infrastructure that 
can promote financial inclusion. Given the benefit provided by offline authentication, it is 
better for platforms to adopt a hybrid operating model that combines both online and offline 
business, as offline business will give the financial excluded a better opportunity. In addition, 
to mitigate financial exclusion, the government can subsidize platforms with offline business 
due to higher cost of the business model. Given the inception of inclusive finance development 
strategy, subsidies to these P2P platform are also the best use of the funding. Lastly, the 
education is beneficial to the financial excluded, which sends a good signal to lenders. The 
platforms can therefore offer some online courses to borrowers so they will have a better 
understanding of their future financial commitment provided that borrowers often rush to take 
a loan decision without thinking their ability of paying back.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This study examines the association between financial exclusion and P2P funding success. We 
find there is a negative indirect effect of financial exclusion and P2P funding success through 
borrowers’ credit score. Moreover, the indirect effect takes account for about 98% of total 
effect, which is consistent with our prediction that credit score is an important channel between 
financial exclusion and funding success. The result supports the argument that fintech 
innovation doesn’t help mitigating financial exclusion. We then explore the moderating role of 
offline authentication and education attainment in the relationship between financial exclusion 
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and funding success through credit score. The results suggest the negative indirect effect of 
financial exclusion on funding success through credit score is overturned if excluded borrowers 
have conducted offline authentication or have a higher education attainment (master or above). 
Lastly, we investigate the determinants of borrowers’ willingness to conduct offline 
authentication. Excluded borrowers are less likely to conduct offline authentication though 
their application will benefit from offline authentication. In addition, local branch plays a 
significant role in offline authentication decision. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
This thesis investigates in different aspects of P2P lending. First, drawing on signaling and 
message framing theory, the finding suggests that positively-framed message as a cheap signal 
can be effective in increasing the probability of a loan being funded. We also find overly-
positive message has a negative impact on funding success. Moreover, the finding shows cheap 
signal (message framing) and costly signal (e.g., credit rating) complement to each other in 
determining the likelihood of funding success.  
Second, lenders’ decision can be influenced by psychological perspective. We connect P2P 
literature and psycholinguistic literature and explain how psychological distancing measured 
by linguistic style influences lenders’ decision on funding campaign. The finding shows 
psychological distancing is inversely related to P2P funding success. In addition, language 
intensity negatively strengthens the negative relationship between psychological distancing 
and funding success. Our findings are in line with the notion that psychological distancing is 
associated with negative personal outcomes (Simmons et al, 2005; Revenstorf et al, 1984). 
Third, there is a long debate of effectiveness of fintech on financial exclusion given that the 
emerging of fintech is to make more people financially inclusive. We find a negative indirect 
effect of financial exclusion on funding success via credit score. Moreover, the findings also 
suggest offline authentication and education attainment positively moderates the association 
between the financial excluded and credit score and thus negative indirect effect of financial 
exclusion on funding success is mitigated. Given the benefit of the offline authentication, we 
examine the determinants of offline authentication. The finding suggests borrower in a city 
with better financial infrastructure are more likely to conduct offline authentication. However, 
financial excluded borrowers are less likely to conduct offline authentication.  
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Three empirical chapters shed new light and provide insights on different aspects of P2P market. 
The conclusion chapter is to integrate and summarize the key contributions and implications 
of these chapters. Finally, it offers potential avenues for further studies.  
 
5.1 key contributions 
This thesis makes several main contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the role of 
language in entrepreneurial finance. The study 1 and study 2 discuss both positive and negative 
language and suggest the language plays an important role in funding campaign. Second, it 
makes contributions to the debate of financial innovation and financial inclusion. The results 
show the financial innovation not necessarily improves financial inclusion. Following 
paragraphs will elaborate the contributions in details.   
The findings of study 1 (chapter 2) show positively framed messages related to trust have a 
positive influence on funding performance but not on number of bids. The study reconciles 
mixed findings in the literature regarding online reviews (e.g. Ludwig et al., 2013; Salehan and 
Kim, 2016) by suggesting that message framing matters in context of online environment. 
Drawing upon message framing and costless signaling theory, the study shows language can 
be an effective signal even though it does not cost too much. The findings are also consistent 
with marketing literature which posits framings have a larger effect when consumers have 
limited knowledge about the product (Chang, 2007). In P2P platforms, lenders are barely 
familiar with the borrowers or the projects that they are going to invest. Moreover, the study 
contributes to traditional signaling theory which suggests cheap signals are not able to create a 
separating equilibrium between better and worse signalers (Balvers et al., 2014). The difficulty 
for lenders to assess costly signals may justify the importance of language as a cheap signal in 
P2P lending decisions. Importantly, the findings show cheap signals complement costly signals 
in achieving funding success. This implies costly signals and costless signals are complemented 
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to assess the quality of the potential borrowers, which is consistent with a small number of 
studies that show costly signals are beneficial on funding success while cheap signals enhance 
the benefit by promoting communications between entrepreneurs and funders (Davis and 
Allison, 2013). Such communication is particularly important in virtual environments, in which 
impression formation based on face-to-face interactions and experiences is lacking.  The 
finding responses the call for research on interaction of various signals on outcomes (Anglin et 
al., 2018). The extant studies so far tend to examine external signals in isolations (Anglin et al., 
2018). The costly signals mitigate the risks of cheating and any costs associated with 
misleading signals (Connely et al., 2011). However, the costs of relying exclusively on costly 
signals and assessing them may be high. As such, the complementary use of cheap signals may 
be cost-effective for senders of such signals.  
The second study bridges the psycholinguistics literature and P2P lending literature and finds 
psychological distancing negatively affects P2P funding performance. The finding is related to 
psycholinguistics literature that posits psychological distancing has a negative impact on 
interpersonal outcome (Simmons et al, 2005; Revenstorf et al, 1984). Moreover, it shows the 
language intensity strengthens the negative relationship between funding success and 
psychological distancing, which is also consistent with the argument that suggest showing an 
extreme position is negatively related to perceived source competence and reduces persuasive 
power (Buller et al., 1998). The study 2 contributes the literature on following aspects. First 
the paper is closely associated with the role of language in crowdfunding (Parhankangas and 
Renko, 2017; Anglin et al., 2018; Herzenstein et al., 2011; Allison et al., 2013; Majumdar and 
Bose, 2018).  
The intent of the literature is to show how borrowers improve their funding performance by 
strategically using language. Drawing on message framing or signaling theory, studies focus 
on narratives that have been written on purpose (Huang et al., 2020; Anglin et al., 2018; Block 
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et al., 2018). They ignore the fact that borrowers sometime write something unconsciously but 
this can also affect lenders’ perception. Drawing on psycholinguistics literature, study 2 shows 
unconscious use of certain language styles resulting in high psychological distancing has a 
negative effect on funding performance. Second, the study contributes to language expectancy 
theory. Existing literature adopts language expectancy theory to test how message features such 
as opinionated language, sequential message, language intensity, message contents, lexical 
complexity or fear arousing appeals to meet the receivers’ expectation (Averbeck and Miller, 
2014; Foste and Botero, 2012; Jensen et al., 2013). They tend to neglect relatively invisible 
style words. The study 2 fills the research gap by suggesting that receivers have expectation on 
linguistic styles as well. The linguistic styles that show similarity and clarity of speech are more 
likely to meet the expectation of the borrowers. Lastly, existing studies examine linguistic 
styles and language intensity separately. However, language intensity that is closely related to 
tone of communication cannot be separately from linguistic styles. Recipients form their 
opinion about quality of messages from both linguistic styles and tone of communication 
simultaneously. Therefore, investigating the interaction effect of language intensity and 
linguistic style is necessary. the results suggest that language intensity negatively strengthen 
the negative association between the number of second person pronouns and funding success 
but has no significant effect on the relationship between negations and funding success. 
Crowdfunding is an interdisciplinary area, which requires not only purely finance perspectives 
but strategy and management, psychology and sociology as well. Cumming and Johan (2017) 
call for the synthesis of various research areas to advance theories and empirical testing in 
crowdfunding. In this end, we response their call by integrating psycholinguistics literature and 
P2P study. 
The study 3 contributes to two streams of literature. First, it makes contributions to P2P lending 
literature. Existing P2P studies focus on direct effect on funding performance but overlook 
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indirect effect and underlying channels (Freedman and Jin, 2017; Dorfleitner et al, 2016; 
Herzenstein et al, 2011; Michels, 2012). The reason is probably because in the US or other 
major P2P market, the P2P platform plays a little or no role in the investors’ decision making 
process. However, in China, due to lack of nationwide-recognized credit rating system, 
investors rely heavily on the credit score provided by the P2P platform. Moreover, the funding 
decision is made very quickly. 25% of campaigns are fully funded within 42 seconds and 75% 
of them get funded in less than 180 seconds (Liao et al., 2019). If investors take a longer time 
to make the decision, investment opportunity is gone. Due to time constraint, investors tend to 
only attend a few salient information. Credit rating which is given by the platform therefore 
plays a vital role in the relationship between funding success and the financial excluded. We 
find credit score in fact mediates the association between the financial excluded and funding 
campaign outcome. We contribute to the P2P literature by providing evidence that there is a 
negative mediation effect of credit score for the financial excluded on funding success. Second, 
the study contributes financial exclusion literature. The discussion about alleviating financial 
exclusion has a long history. Whether Fintech is able to combat financial exclusion remains 
unclear. We investigate the extent to which the financial excluded can benefit from one of the 
important fintechs, P2P lending. We find although the financial excluded borrowers are less 
likely to be funded, offline authentication, a new business model invented by Chinese P2P 
firms, and their education qualification can positively moderate the linkage between the 
financial excluded and credit score and therefore increase probability of being funded. Our 
results also suggest although offline authentication can provide additional benefit to the 
excluded borrowers, they remain reluctant to conduct authentication. The reason probably is 
the borrowers who are financially excluded are reluctant to have face-to-face interaction with 
other people, which is consistent with the finding that financial exclusion may lead to social 
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exclusion (Wilson, 2012). Lastly, the financial infrastructure such as local branch plays a 
positive role in encouraging the borrowers to do the offline authentication.  
 
 
5.2 Implications  
 
The study 1 suggests that message framing as a cheap signal can be effective in enhancing 
the likelihood of a project being funded. In particular, messages framed in a way to signal 
trustworthiness of potential borrowers have greater likelihood for funding success. Potential 
borrowers signaling messages for P2P lenders need to frame their messages with words such 
as honesty, integrity, credence, and reliable which signal their trustworthiness quality. 
Besides trustworthiness, potential borrowers can also display other qualities through language 
to attract investors and increase the potential for funding success. For example, signaling 
words associated with the agility, proactiveness, ambiguousness, empathy and network size 
of a potential borrower may support lenders’ decisions on whether the borrower is worth 
investing. In this sense, message framing can be very relevant. Furthermore, as suggested by 
our findings, to enhance the odds of funding success, costly signals such as information on 
the credit rating of a potential borrower can be complemented by suitably framed message 
embedded in the description of the project. This is because, when a borrower communicates 
their credit rating through objectively assessed evidence, their continuous emphasis on their 
credit history may only have a supplementary role, and thus have marginal additional 
influence on their funding success. If borrowers seeking for funds can enhance their 
communication mode through the use of positive messages, their qualities, which can be 
objectively assessed, would be supported through language, and therefore increase the 
likelihood of being funded 
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The study 2 provides some practical implications. For borrowers, it is important to avoid 
psychological distancing with lenders through linguistic styles and tone of communication. It 
is likely that borrowers use certain linguistic styles unconsciously which distances them from 
the crowd. However, this can be avoided if the borrowers take a longer time to prepare their 
loan application. For example, borrowers should reduce the use of second person pronouns and 
negations. Especially in China, the use of second person pronouns, “ni” shows disrespectful. 
Recipients are confused if high frequency use of negations in the communication because it is 
difficult to process negations for human beings. In addition, showing an extreme position 
through intensive language may reduce the probability of funding success further. Lenders may 
have some doubts about their payback ability in this circumstances. Therefore, less intensive 
tone is suggested when the borrowers ask for a loan.  
The study 3 offers several practical implications. The study suggests that the indirect effect of 
the financial excluded through credit score plays a major role in funding performance instead 
of direct effect. It is therefore possible to allay financial exclusion by improving the credit score 
system. For example, in recent years, big data offers opportunity to incorporate digital 
footprints such as the website that the borrowers visited and the mobile they used (i.e. IOS or 
Android) in assessing borrowers’ creditworthiness. Such big data provides more 
comprehensive and accurate credit information than traditional data (Berg et al., 2020). It also 
may give the financial excluded a better chance when the platforms use it to determine their 
credit scores. Furthermore, the results from study 3 show offline authentication and human 
capital such as education attainment can improve the likelihood of funding success 
significantly and the establishment of offline branch can lead to higher probability of offline 
authentication. The offline branch is hence considered an important financial infrastructure that 
can promote financial inclusion. Given the benefit provided by offline authentication, it is 
better for platforms to adopt a hybrid operating model that combines both online and offline 
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business, as offline business will give the financial excluded a better opportunity. In addition, 
to mitigate financial exclusion, the government can subsidize platforms with offline business 
due to higher cost of the business model. Given the inception of inclusive finance development 
strategy, subsidies to these P2P platform are also the best use of the funding. Lastly, the 
education is beneficial to the financial excluded, which sends a good signal to lenders. The 
platforms can therefore offer some online courses to borrowers so they will have a better 
understanding of their future financial commitment provided that borrowers often rush to take 
a loan decision without thinking their ability of paying back.  
 
5.3 Future Directions and Research Agenda  
 
This thesis analyzes the role of language in P2P lending and the association between P2P 
lending and financial exclusion. Importantly, this study focused on borrower-related issues at 
the individual level from only the borrower perspective. Future research can use a multi-level 
study to analyze how individual-related and environmental issues, from both borrower and 
investor perspective, may affect funding performance of potential borrowers. Another issue is 
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